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ABSTRACT

The Role Of Industry Structure On Customer Value In Robotic Surgery
BY
Berkley Baker
May 2015

Committee Chair: Daniel Robey
Major Academic Unit: Computer Information Systems
Spending on robot surgery is expected to increase by $17 billion in the next 6 years. This
new surgical treatment has challenged hospitals with higher costs and varying performance.
Healthcare executives struggle balancing the adoption of medical innovations with managing
healthcare costs. This dilemma can be further complicated by industry structures relative to
capital-intensive medical innovations. This research explores the interaction between industry
structure and customer value. Specifically, how can hospitals apply an understanding of supplier
industry structure and customer value to improve the value of a robotic surgery program (RSP)?
This industry study represents an exhaustive longitudinal review of over 15 years of public data
relative to robotic surgery, across three distinct time periods. Within the research, industry
structure is evaluated using Porter’s 5-forces model. A framework based upon contributions
from Grönroos as well as Menon, Homburg, and Beutin is introduced to assess customer value
based upon clinical, financial and strategic (CFS) value. The implications of periodic industry
structure on customer value were examined to identify opportunities for hospital executives to
increase RSP customer value.

xvi

There were several empirical and theoretical findings from this research. First, in the
face of increasing industry structure the identification of favorable forces may create
opportunities to increase RSP value. Secondarily, exploring customer value through the lens of
core, add-on, relational and transactional benefits in the sub-context of CFS value aids in the
identification of market power influences on customer value. The implications of the absence of
high levels of relational and transactional benefits without high levels of core and add-on
benefits may influence avenues of pursuit in improving RSP value overall. The research also
suggests that clinical and strategic value was present despite varying degrees of industry
structure. Finally, this study represents an empirical joint analysis of industry structure and
customer value in robotic surgery. Some proponents may find the introduction of an integrative
model for measuring customer value in robotic surgery, applicable to other capital-intensive
medical innovations or disruptive technologies at large.

xvii

I
I.1

HEALTHCARE AND CAPITAL-INTENSIVE MEDICAL INNOVATIONS

Introduction
At present, the United States healthcare system consists of about 6,500 hospitals with a

combined annual revenue exceeding $700 billion (First Research, Inc. 2009). America’s 76
million surviving baby boomers began turning 65 in 2011, while the life expectancy of seniors is
growing (Plunkett Research, Ltd., 2013). Meanwhile, healthcare costs continue to increase,
outpacing inflation. In the United States, healthcare spending is expected to reach nearly five
trillion dollars by 2022 (Munro, 2014). Changes in healthcare have pressured hospital executives
to decrease infections and shorten patients’ length of stay. Healthcare executives struggle to
design solutions for a growing aging patient population, improve clinical outcomes, reduce the
cost of care, and remain competitive in a hypercompetitive industry. This industrial environment
is representative of a VUCA environment, volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (Casey,
2014), as defined by General Casey, retired Army Chief of Staff and Commanding General of
Multinational Force in Iraq. Faced with an increasing amount of change, many hospital
executives are considering robotic surgery to address their multifaceted needs.
Largely regarded as a capital-intensive medical innovation, robotic surgery created a new
market while muddling the existing markets of traditional and laparoscopic surgical techniques.
Today hospital stakeholders are investing and re-investing in robotics to solve problems related
to patient demand, physician retention, recruiting, and brand imaging, among other concerns.
Many hospital executives have chosen robotic surgery as an advanced technology to improve
patient outcomes, address surgical shortcomings, and to develop competitive advantages. As a
result, robotic surgery systems have become one of the fastest growing medical devices in the
history of U.S healthcare.
1

In 2000, Intuitive Surgical introduced the first immersive robotic surgery platform, the da
Vinci® Surgical System, which enables surgeons to perform complex surgical procedures in a
minimally invasive fashion (Kalan et al., 2010). This surgical technique provides surgeons with
increased dexterity, improved vision, and augmented control through a series of technological
innovations. Many of these benefits have been heralded as advantages over other surgical
techniques, such as conventional open and laparoscopic surgery (Kalan et al., 2010). As one of
the most successful medical device success stories in the history of U.S. healthcare, industry
sales were reported in excess of $2 billion annually in 2014 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report
2014). In December 2002, there were approximately 12 da Vinci® Surgical Systems (Intuitive
Surgical, Annual Report 2000). Today there are almost 3,000 da Vinci® Surgical Systems
operating in healthcare institutions across the world (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report 2014).
Despite its initial market success, many consumers question the value of robotic surgery
programs (RSPs). This new surgical treatment has challenged hospitals with higher surgical costs
and varying performance. As new RSPs further penetrate the marketplace, many question robotic
surgery’s impact on improved patient outcomes, surgeon performance, and value to hospitals.
This research suggests that this questioning is rooted in the role of industry structure on the
creation of customer value.
Industry structure is the configuration of a company’s industry, which influences
competition and profitability (Magretta, 2013). A competitive environment contains an element
of struggle between multiple parties striving for similar goals. Industry structure or market power
allows organizations to see themselves within the context of the big picture and to competitively
position themselves toward increased value and profitability, demystifying the behavior of
buyers, suppliers, new entrants, and existing competitors within a marketplace. This research
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applied Michael Porter’s 5-Forces model to evaluate the strength of the robotic surgery
manufacturer’s market power. A comprehensive analysis of the robotic surgery industry may
contribute to understanding the ways in which industry structure influences customer value.
Moreover, the adoption of a capital-intensive medical innovation by hospitals absent an
understanding of supplier industry structure may detract from the benefits of the innovation. The
purpose of this research is to explore the role of supplier industry structure on the creation of
value for hospital RSPs. I accomplished this by analyzing robotic surgery industry structures and
the resulting implications for customer value. Specifically, this study will be based upon an
exhaustive review of over 15 years of secondary data relative to robotic surgery.
I.2
I.2.1

Literature Review
Robotic Surgery.
Conventional surgery is generally associated with an incision made by a surgeon to gain

access to targeted anatomy. The invasiveness of traditional surgery is typically more pronounced
because the surgeon uses either his hands or surgical tools to directly manipulate the anatomy.
By the early 1990’s, laparoscopy began to gain traction in the surgical community. In a
laparoscopic surgical approach the surgeon gains access to the target anatomy through multiple
small incisions (Figure 1: Laparoscopic Surgery).

3

Figure 1 Laparoscopic Surgery
© 2014 www.melakafertility.com

This less invasive surgical approach generally offers patients a faster recovery time with
equivalent or better clinical outcomes. Laparoscopic procedures require instrumentation designed
to manipulate key anatomy with specialized instruments that replicate many of the tools designed
for the traditional surgical approach. Although laparoscopic surgery presented limitations, as
surgeons were no longer able to palpate tissue and tumors with their hands, physicians quickly
adapted to this less invasive surgical method.
Nonetheless, this approach offered new challenges. The surgeon now observed the
procedure using a camera, which provided a 2-D image. This two-dimensional viewing made
judging depth extremely difficult. Surgeons became more dependent on staff, as surgical
technicians and nurse practitioners frequently controlled the camera directing the surgeon’s line
of sight. Occasionally, operating with longer, non-wristed instruments made it difficult for
surgeons to manipulate target anatomy. These new instruments also exacerbated surgeon tremor,
as small movements from surgeons’ hands were heightened at the tips of the instruments.
Consequently, these limitations in surgeon adaptability and procedural complexity disrupted the
broad adoption of the laparoscopic technique.
4

In spite of these challenges, many procedures once performed exclusively in an open
surgical environment are now performed laparoscopically as standard of care. This trend is very
Schumpeteresque in its application, exemplifying ‘creative destruction’ demonstrated by
surgeons as they innovated beyond the limitations of traditional surgery (Schumpeter, 2013). As
a result of this trend in creative destruction, surgeons are once again exploring technology
beyond the innovations of traditional laparoscopic surgery, potentially expanding the population
of physicians practicing minimally invasive approaches to a broader surgeon population across
an extended segment of simple and complex procedures.
Specifically, the da Vinci® Surgical System translates the surgeon’s hand movements on
instrument controls at a console into micro-movements of instruments positioned inside patients
through miniature incisions (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report 2013). The console provides the
surgeon with a 3-D stereoscopic view in high definition, replicating the traditional open surgeon
view, while operating with a minimally invasive surgical technique (Intuitive Surgical, Annual
Report 2013). From the console, the surgeon is able to control 3-4 robotic arms located on the
patient cart, giving the surgeon control over the camera and 2-3 instrument arms (Intuitive
Surgical, Annual Report 2013). Overall, this robotic system provides surgeons with immersive
3DHD visualization, precise and tremor-free endoscope control, intuitive instrument movements,
EndoWrist® instruments, scaled-tremor free instrument movement, improved surgical
ergonomics, a multi-specialty platform, and advanced training tools (Figure 2:Robotic Surgery
System) (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report 2013).

5

Figure 2 Robotic Surgery System
©[2014] Intuitive Surgical, Inc

While global laparoscopy annual sales are expected to grow from $8.1 billion in 2012 to
$12.3 billion by 2018, the annual global robotic surgery expenditure is expected to outpace that
growth, from $3.2 billion in 2012 to $19.9 billion by 2019 (WinterGreen Research, 2013).
Robotic procedures have catapulted from less than 25,000 in 2005 (Kowalczyk, 2013) to over
570,000 procedures performed in 2014 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report 2014). The popularity,
and resulting growth, of robotic surgery is a result of the clinical, financial and strategic (CFS)
value it affords. By driving minimally invasive benefits to patients across multiple surgical
specialties, this technological innovation is poised to expand and greatly influence patient
demand, surgical techniques, product usage, and purchasing patterns in the future.
I.2.2

Industry Structure.
Warren Buffet indicated that industries demonstrate distinct economic characteristics

(Williams, 2014), which influence the profitability of industry participants, and Jack Welch
utilized industry structure in divestiture decisions as the CEO of General Electric (Suutari, 2000).
Analysts tend to understand the influence of industry structure as it relates to competitive
strategy or investing. The preponderance of industry structure research addresses the impact of
6

industry structure on profitability, firm performance, strategic choices (Porter, 1980), and even
how firms can influence industry structure to improve their own profitability (Makadok, 2013).
In many cases, researchers have utilized the constructs of industry structure in conjunction with
other frameworks or topics of interest (Table 1: Industry Structure and Related Topics).
Table 1 Industry Structure and Related Topics
SOURCE

RELATED TOPIC

Datta, D. K. and Rajagopalan N. (1998). Industry Structure And CEO
Characteristics: An Empirical Study Of Succession Events. Strategic
Management Journal 19.9 (833).

CEO Characteristics

Nohria, N. and Garcia-Pont, C. (1991) Global Strategic Linkages And Industry
Structure Strategic Management Journal12, 105-124.
DOI: 10.1002/smj.4250120909.

Global Strategic Linkages

Gong, J., & Srinagesh, P. (1996). Network competition and industry structure.
Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(4), 1231-1241.

Network Competition

Jamison, M. (1999). Industry structure and pricing: the new rivalry in
infrastructure (Vol. 22). Springer.

Pricing Strategy

Erhemjamts, O., Raman, K., & Shahrur, H. (2010). Industry structure and
corporate debt maturity. Financial Review, 45(3), 627-657.

Corporate Debt

Hunt, R. M. (2004). Patentability, industry structure, and innovation. The Journal
of Industrial Economics, 52(3), 401-425.

Patents and Licensing

Flaherty, M. T. (1980). Industry structure and cost-reducing investment.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1187-1209.

Cost Reductions

Demsetz, H. (1973). Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy.
Journal of Law and economics, 1-9.

Public Policy

In 1980, Harvard University professor Michael Porter introduced the 5-Forces model,
which explored the forces driving industry competition (Porter, 1980). A survey of the leading
Strategic Management textbooks found the inclusion of Porter’s model in each one (Dobbs,
2012). According to Google Scholar, Porter’s work regarding competitive advantage and
industry structure has been cited almost 240,000 times. As language influences the behavior of
individuals subjected to cultural context, industry structure influences the behavior of firms that
are subjected to industry context (Porter, 1980.) Industry structure not only affects the nature of
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competition (Baumol, Panzar, Willig and Bailey, 1982) and profitability (Makadok, 2013), but it
also impacts the nature of strategic choices available to firm participants (Porter, 1980). Through
the introduction of the 5-Forces framework (Figure 3: 5-Forces), Porter explored industry
influencers beyond economic structure (Porter, 1980). The 5-forces are captured as the threat of
new entry, industry rivalry, threat of substitution, bargaining power of buyers and bargaining
power of suppliers (Porter, 1980).

Figure 3 Forces
(Porter, 1980)

As an economist, Porter’s work largely simplified areas of microeconomics into a
template of terms for practical usage (Recklies, 2001). See Table 2: 5-Forces and
Microeconomic Constructs. This template enables decision makers to apprehend competitive
influences that go beyond typical competitors to a broader set of participants. Given the
applicability of the model, 5-Forces was used to evaluate industries (Powell, 1996), firms
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(Bowen, Daigle, Dion, and Valentine, 2014), marketing strategies (Renko, Sustic and Butigan,
2011), and even the delivery of vascular surgery (Sumpio, 2013). In most cases, the theoretical
and practical application of Porter’s model is a measure to assess the current status of an
industry.
Table 2 5-Forces and Microeconomic Constructs
(Source: Recklies, 2001)
5-FORCES

MICROECONOMIC CONSTRUCTS

Threat of New Entry

Market entry barriers

Industry Rivalry

Market structures, number of players, market size and growth rates

Threat of Substitution

Substitution effect

Bargaining Power of Buyers

Supply and demand theory, customer behavior, price elasticity

Bargaining Power of

Supply and demand theory, cost and production theory, price elasticity

Suppliers

Despite its widespread application, the 5-Forces model has frequently come under fire.
Critique of the model surfaced during the growth of the Internet and the dotcom era, arguing that
5-Forces does not account for dynamic changes that have influenced many industries (Dälken,
2014). Others derided the retrospective nature of the model, citing its ability to explain but its
ineptitude in the area of prediction (Stewart, 2009). Some critiqued the model as too
macroeconomic in focus, noting poor linkages to management options based upon assessment,
and criticized its excessive fixation on industry boundaries (Grundy, 2006). In 2008, Michael
Porter critiqued the lack of quantitative measures to bolster the model (Dobbs, 2012). Porter also
conveyed disappointment regarding the application of the model solely as an assessment of
industry appeal as opposed to a method of gaining strategic insight (Dobbs, 2012). Some have
stated that the model does not account for the speed and nature of change that has characterized
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so many disruptive innovations (Raina, 2014). In essence, the model’s focus on strategic
initiatives, profitability, and minimizing competition engendered some of the harshest criticism.
One author stated, “In the theoretical landscape that Porter invented, all strategy worthy of the
name involves avoiding competition and seeking out above-average profits protected by
structural barriers. Strategy is all about figuring out how to secure excess profits without having
to make a better product or deliver a better service” (Denning, 2012).
Without a focus on delivering better service or enhancing customer value, the value of
the 5-forces model has been limited. This limitation of value is, in part, due to the model’s
application within the context of the industry; the other limitation is related to the lack of depth
and rigor in its application in creating customer value. Thus far, there have been relatively few
contributions seeking to extend the application of the 5-force model in either direction. However,
there have been a few attempts worth exploring.
There have been extensions of the model within the context of industry structure analysis.
“Rethinking and reinventing Michael Porter’s five forces model” is an article that explores
enhancing the practical application of the 5-Forces model (Grundy, 2006). Grundy considered
expanding the use of the 5-forces model to map competitive force variations, explore competitive
dynamics, prioritize the forces, and examine force interdependencies (Grundy, 2006). The point
of his work was to develop the 5-Forces model to “improve its analytical power and increase its
range of application” (Grundy, 2006:216). A few interesting potential applications from
(Grundy, 2006) were as follows:
•

•

Combining the use of the 5-forces model with the PEST factors model to explore the
interdependencies between industry structure and political, economic, social and
technological factors.
Extending evaluation of the 5-forces from favorable, neutral, and unfavorable to a vectorbased approach, which allows for the assessment of favorability as well as priority.
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•
•

Evaluating each force not simply independently, but relative to the others.
Exploring, at a macro level, how the forces impact longitudinally (Grundy, 2006).
One of the most notable evolutions of the model originated from Michael Porter

himself, who, in 2011, co-authored an article in the Harvard Business Review titled, “Creating
Shared Value” (Porter, 2011). In the article, Porter assesses the problem with modern day
capitalism as, “They [Companies] continue to view value creation narrowly, optimizing shortterm financial performance in a bubble while missing the most important customer needs and
ignoring the broader influences that determine their longer-term success (Porter, 2011:4).”
Critics declare that a narrowly focused view is an outgrowth of an overly strategic one (Denning,
2012). Some conclude that this is an example of Porter’s own evolution and adaptation as he
weighed the effectiveness of an evaluation of industry structure without connecting the resulting
assessments into a conversation regarding the creation of customer value.
In 2006, Porter and Teisberg (2006) introduced “Redefining Health Care”, which sought
to improve healthcare through the application of competitive principals in order to influence
patient value (Porter, 2006). This evolution in Porter’s thinking is further evident when
comparing Michael Porter’s discussion of the structural analysis of industries in his book,
“Competitive Strategies: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors," published in
1980, with the same discussion in his book, “On Competition,” updated and published in 2008.
In the later edition, Porter concludes a chapter with a discussion of competition and value
(Porter, 2008). He further builds on the topic in the end of the book with a discussion on
corporate social responsibility (Porter, 2008). It is appropriate to incorporate shared value into
the discussion, because it is based upon the “premise that both economic and social progress
must be addressed using value principles” (Porter and Kramer, 2011:6). Does this accurately
capture the essence of value creation in healthcare? A discussion of value creation within robotic
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surgery is irrelevant and inadequate without addressing the context of societal value creation.
The literature review of robotic surgery and industry structure provides the basis for attempts to
expand customer value through an understanding of industry structure.
I.2.3

Taxonomy of Customer Value.
Many business researchers have contributed to the classifications of business or customer

value. Christian Grönroos’ (1997) work explored the impact of relational and transactional intent
on customer value. Both behaviors can bring value, but relational intent carries a long-term focus
on value, while transactional intent has more of a short-term focus (Grönroos, 1997). Menon,
Homburg, and Beutin (2005) contributed a rare look at customer value within the context of the
business-to-business environment. Their research pursues an understanding of the topic of
customer value by equating it to the summation of core benefits and add-on benefits minus
purchase price, acquisition costs, and operational costs. In the face of high (purchase, acquisition,
and operational) cost in robotic surgery (Menon, Homburg, Beutin, 2005), this exploration is
especially relevant to the topic of value.
Smith and Colgate (2007) first approached the topic of value creation by exploring much
of the previous research conducted on the topic. They furthered that research by suggesting a
new conceptual framework for customer value creation. Their framework evaluates the tenets of
customer value based upon functional/instrumental value, experiential/hedonic value,
symbolic/expressive value, and cost/sacrifice value (Smith and Colgate, 2007). The intent of this
framework was not simply to identify what customers get in contrast to the cost of those benefits,
as present in the previous three equations; rather, the intent of this framework was to identify
taxonomies of value that could lead to differentiation in value (Smith and Colgate, 2007).
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Research on customer value also hinges on the contributions of Jay Barney related to
resource-based view (Barney, 1991). Similar to Porter, Barney built on the discussion of value as
being unique, but he added the constructs of rarity, imitability, and substitutability (Barney,
1991). To date, Michael Porter has produced the preponderance of the work regarding the
creation of value through the use of value propositions, value chains, and value systems. Porter
details strategic opportunities that will result in superior economic performance based on the
following five assessments: 1) unique value, 2) activity differentiation, 3) trade-offs, 4)
organizational fit, and 5) sustainability (Magretta, 2013). These considerations provide the
outline for a company’s value proposition, value chains, and overall value system. Competitive
advantages, or value proposition, have been defined as the unique value a company may create
for its customers (Porter, 1998). The contributions of the RBV not only complement and
reinforce the discussion of competitive advantage (Porter, 1980), but they also introduce the
importance of heterogeneity and immobility relative to customer value (Barney, 1991).
As early as 1993, the logic regarding value systems began to progress. Researchers
understood the advent of value propositions built upon competitive advantages, and value chains
were heavily discussed as firms endeavored to identify their value activities and associated costs.
The predominant viewpoint towards improving customer value included either increasing the
value proposition or reducing costs within the value chain. In their article, “From Value Chain to
Value Constellation: Designing Interactive Strategy,” Normann and Ramirez (1993) attempted to
alter that thinking. While prior thinking regarding value systems focused on attempts to
influence the value equation by altering either the value proposition or the value chain, Normann
and Ramirez focused attention on neither component individually, but rather on the collective
system application (Normann and Ramirez, 1993). This integrated approach led to a distinctive
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framework based upon the following propositions: 1) the goal of business is not to provide
something valuable for customers, but rather to enable customers to create value for themselves;
2) the most attractive offerings are no longer produced by a single company, but rather by new
combinations of customers, suppliers, and business partners; and 3) the only true source of
competitive advantage is the ability to construct the entire value-creating system (Normann and
Ramirez, 1993). This contribution is significantly relevant to robotic surgery in that it encourages
firms to maintain more of a systematic approach to value, with a concentration on enabling
customers to experience new and customized streams of value. This viewpoint suggest that there
is value enclosed not only in the individual value components, but in the system – which, in our
example, is represented by the interactions between patients, surgeons, hospitals, robotic
manufacturers, robotic substitutes, and others.
Vandenbosch and Dawar (2002) also found that much of the previous value system
research focused primarily on the “levers of cost and risk,” which reference the cost related to
the value chain and the risk of not actualizing the value proposition (Vandenbosch and Dawar,
2002). They suggested a systematic approach of value to 1) unlock economies of interaction; 2)
simplify the route to benefits; 3) integrate activities; 4) be the nexus; and 5) form the future.
This approach suggests the reinforcing relationship between a transactional and relational view
of value.
Consider next the progression of views relative to the creation of value as examined by
Stanley Slater, who discussed the neoclassic view of the firm, which focuses on the impact of
labor and capital on the production of product to maximize profits (Slater, 1997). The behavioral
view seeks to account for goals dispersant from profit maximization by introducing a framework
which allows for the views of individuals or groups having their own goals (Slater, 1997). This
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may, in part, contribute to local optimization and the problem of latent value. The transactional
cost view emphasizes the opportunities relative to firms in the creation of value due to scaled
economies (Slater, 1997).
Lastly, Barney found these views inadequate since they focused predominantly on value
creation relative to the firm, to the exclusion of the customer. Slater’s approach was a customeroriented view in which the firm’s existence was to satisfy the customer (Slater, 1997). This view
introduced the concept of a more customer-centric “market orientation,” with the constructs of
value nestled in 1) continuous learning about the customer, 2) a commitment to innovation, and
3) a customer value process-focused organization (Slater, 1997).
This customer-oriented value approach, with the inclusion of a feedback loop, continued.
In 2013, Moryosseff Gertner cited the work of Normann and Ramirez but added a crucial
component to their work: the inclusion of a feedback loop to identify and satisfy consumers’
fluctuating needs (Gertner, 2013). This contribution was essential in that it identified the need for
the value system to enhance collective value through the exchange of information (Gertner,
2013). These contributions add to the conversation by highlighting the delineation between onetime foundational approaches to value and more iterative and interactive approaches to creating
value.
These constructs are of particular importance to value within the conversation of robotic
surgery. Many hospitals have approached RSPs assuming that the value is inherent in the
implementation of the program or the initial purchase of the robotic system. This transactional
view fails to consider the impact of heterogeneity and immobility, both of which greatly
influence organizational ability to create sustainable competitive advantages in the delivery of
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customer value. These taxonomies will prove useful in exploring the dynamics of clinical,
strategic and financial (CSF) value within RSPs. (Figure 4: RSP Value Triangle).

Figure 4 Robotic Surgery Program Value Triangle
The literature review included an introduction to the robotic surgery industry, a
discussion of industry structure using Porter’s 5-forces framework, and a culminating look at the
topic of customer value creation. Taken together, the results provide a basis for exploring a new
approach to studying the role of industry structure and customer value in robotic surgery. The
key research question for this proposal is: How can hospitals apply an understanding of supplier
industry structure and customer value to improve the customer value of a RSP? I approached this
proposal by evaluating the industry structure using 5-forces, predicting the role of the industry
structure on customer value, appraising customer value based upon CFS value, and exploring the
interactions between industry and customer value to discover new ways for value creation
(Figure 5: Research Model).

16

Figure 5 Research Model

II

CUSTOMER VALUE AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE: AN INTEGRATED &
INTERACTIVE APPROACH

II.1 Research Methodology
This research is designed as a process study with the objective of understanding how
industry structure influences the customer value of a RSP. To that end, I conducted a
longitudinal study of the robotic surgery industry formation and the process in which that
formation influenced customer value. In addition to industry structure, I examined associated
customer value across three distinct time periods: 1999 – 2004; 2005 – 2009; and 2010 – 2014. I
have chosen these periods to capture the introduction of robotic surgery, the adoption of robotic
surgery, and the establishment of robotic surgery. For the purpose of this research, the customer
will be defined as hospitals. The design of this research is an industry study with a focus on
showing how industry structure can impact value attained by various customers in the robotic
surgery industry. The unit of analysis will be at the industry level, which includes physicians,
hospitals, and industry participants.
II.1.1 5-Forces
I conducted the research from the industry vantage point of robotic surgery
manufacturers. Analysis was conducted by examining each force and sub-component and
aggregating the appraisal to determine the overall influence of each force. Each force influences
profitability and competitiveness. In order to account for each force, I utilized the definitions and
criteria included in Table 3:5-Forces Definitions and Criteria and Appendix 1: Industry Structure
Definitions.
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Table 3 5-Forces Definitions and Criteria
(Source: Porter, 2008)

Definitions

THREAT OF
NEW ENTRY
The likelihood
that a new firm
will enter the
industry to
compete with
existing firms.

•
•

•

Criteria

•
•
•
•

•

Economies
of Scale
Demand-side
Benefits of
Scale
Government
Policy
Capital
Requirement
Switching
Costs
Access to
Distribution
Incumbency
Advantages
Independent
of Size
Expected
Retaliation

INDUSTRY
RIVALRY
The current level
of competitive
intensity among
existing firms.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Competitive
Balance
Industry
Growth
Fixed/Margina
l Costs
Differentiation
Overcapacity
Competitive
Diversity
Strategic
Stakes
Exit Barriers

BUYER BARGAINING
POWER

SUPPLIER
BARGAINING
POWER

The applicability
of using similar
products that
perform the same
functions.

The ability of buyers to
demand lower prices, more
expensive services, higher
quality, and/or other terms
that increase manufacturer
costs.

The ability of
suppliers to demand
higher prices, and/or
other terms that
increase manufacturer
costs.

• Priceperformance
Trade-off
• Buyer’s Cost of
Switching to
Substitute

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

SUBSTITUTIONS

Buyer Concentration
Service Differentiation
Industry Purchases
Backward Integration
Switching Costs
Buyer Margins
Service Importance
Full Information

•
•
•
•
•
•

Concentration
Dependency
Switching Costs
Differentiation
Substitutes
Forward Integration

II.1.2 Threat of New Entrants.
As described by Porter, the threat of new entrants can impact industry profitability due to
increased capacity, price pressures, increased cost to compete, and higher rates of reinvestment
(Porter, 1980). The results, when analyzed, question the likelihood that a new manufacturer will
enter the robotic surgery industry to compete with existing firms (Porter, 1980).
II.1.2.1 Economies of Scale.
Porter describes economy of scale as larger volumes leading to lower cost per unit, which
can appear in almost every activity in the value chain including sales, marketing, research, etc.
(Porter, 1980). Economy of scale serves to improve profitability and improve competitive
positioning by reducing marginal costs (Porter, 1980). I utilized statements related to production
costs, sales volumes, and employee resources to evaluate the deterrence capability of robotic
manufacturers based upon economy of scale.
II.1.2.2 Demand-side Benefits of Scale.
Porter identifies demand-side benefits of scale by the presence of network effects,
generally described as increasing the buyer’s willingness to pay as the number of like buyers
increases (Porter, 1980). Demand-side benefits of scale serve to increase profitability and
strengthen competitive positioning as the size of the network increases (Porter, 1980). Within the
robotic industry, I utilized installation base, pricing, procedural volumes, and clinical
publications data to evaluate the deterrence capability of network effects.
II.1.2.3 Government Policy.
Government rules and procedural formalities can negatively or positively impact
profitability and competitiveness, especially in highly regulated industries like healthcare (Porter,
1980). Regulatory environments can influence competiveness based upon entrance standards and
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can also affect profit margins via operational costs of government compliance. I utilized
narratives regarding compliance with the Food and Drug Agency (FDA) in the United States, as
well as international equivalents, to evaluate the deterrent capability of government policy
related to robotic surgery (FDA, 2014).
II.1.2.4 Capital Requirement.
Capital requirement can be summed up simply as the funds necessary to compete (Porter,
1980). Industries such as aerospace and robotic surgery may have fewer manufacturers because
of the capital necessary to enter the industry. These capital requirements can impact
competitiveness based upon the size of competitive firms and may impact profitability given the
investment position necessary to produce a viable product and operate within the industry. To
evaluate the presence of capital requirements as deterrence, I utilized current available research,
development funding, and accumulated debt as my primary measurements.
II.1.2.5 Switching Costs.
Switching costs are used in various contexts throughout Porter’s evaluation. In the
context of threat of new entrants, they are the costs buyers face when changing providers, in this
case robotic system providers (Porter, 1980). If hospitals can easily switch between robotic
manufacturers, there is limited deterrent capability presented by the robotic surgery offering.
Moreover, ease of switching has a mitigating impact on pricing and profitability. I considered
installed base and the amount of robotic surgery units in the market as measures of market
penetration that might make switching cost more influential. I also utilized implementation
capital costs, average annual recurring costs, estimates of customer inventory levels, on-going
service obligations, and training costs to evaluate the cost of switching.
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II.1.2.6 Access to distribution.
Access to distribution relates to the ability of the sales and distribution channel to
generate more customers, or, in this case, the ability to implement or expand hospital RSPs.
Current competitors are rewarded with the opportunity to occupy current channels, which is
enhanced if sales channels are limited (Porter, 1980), thereby influencing competitiveness.
Differing sales channels are also characterized by varying cost, and some sales channels may
offer reduced cost of sales. In order to evaluate these factors, I utilized the number of sales and
marketing personnel as well as narratives related to sales and distribution.
II.1.2.7 Incumbency Advantages Independent of Size.
As opposed to economy of scale advantages, incumbency advantages independent of size
are related to advantages such as proprietary technologies, preferential access, raw materials,
experience curve, etc., which may exist regardless of the size of the organization (Porter, 1980).
These advantages influence product competitiveness and profitability. I examined the number of
patents and procedural experience (by volume) to evaluate the deterrent capability of these
advantages.
II.1.2.8 Expected Retaliation.
This sub-construct relates to ways competitors are expected to retaliate based upon
competitive moves (Porter, 1980). This is often related to industry precedent, means to retaliate,
openness of price slashing, or presence of slow industry growth (Porter, 1980). In this industry, I
utilized cash available and legal action as measures to evaluate the deterrence of expected
retaliation.
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II.1.3 Intensity of Rivalry: Current Competitors.
Competition typically drives down price, diminishing industry participant growth and
profitability. Industry rivalry explores the current level of competitive intensity among existing
firms (Porter, 1980).
II.1.3.1 Competitive Balance.
Porter describes competitive balance as relating to the intensity of rivalry based upon size
and power. Rivalry is greater between firms when they are similar in size and power within an
industry (Porter, 2008). I utilized company revenue, market cap, sales, employee base, and
accumulated deficit to compare manufacturers’ competitive balance.
Industry Growth. This sub-component is simply the rate of growth for the overall
industry. Industries experiencing slower growth rates typically experience intensified rivalry, as
slow growth makes it harder to stay in business (Porter, 1980). I used the overall industry growth
rate to demonstrate this measure.
II.1.3.2 Fixed/Storage Costs.
A high fixed and storage cost creates pressure on manufacturers to cut prices, which
intensifies industry rivalry (Porter, 1980). I considered total assets as a measure to evaluate fixed
and storage costs.
II.1.3.3 Differentiation.
How unique is the product or service offered by each manufacturer? The lack of
differentiation between offerings will reduce switching costs and increase industry rivalry
(Porter, 1980). I utilized product characteristics to evaluate the differentiation between product
offerings.
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II.1.3.4 Overcapacity.
If economies of scale require capacity to be added in large increments, overcapacity and
subsequent price-cutting may result (Porter, 1980). I utilized comments regarding production
levels and evidence of price-cutting to evaluate overcapacity.
II.1.3.5 Competitive Diversity.
A robotic manufacturer with different goals or business methods may confuse fellow
competitors in the market (Porter, 1998). When firms cannot read competitors’ actions and
signals well, competitive diversity is broad and industry rivalry may intensify (Porter, 1980). I
compared corporate goals, objectives, and strategies to evaluate the diversity of industry
competitors.
II.1.3.6 Strategic Stakes.
Rivalry intensifies if firms have a high need to achieve success in a particular industry
(Porter, 1980). In some cases, the importance of the industry may not only increase
competitiveness but also sacrifice profitability (Porter, 1980). I utilized language from annual
and quarterly reports to gauge corporate aspirations and evaluate the importance attached to the
industry.
II.1.3.7 Exit Barriers.
What are the factors that prevent an industry participant from exiting the industry?
Sometimes there are assets, costs, or strategic relationships that create high exit barriers, holding
some industry participants captive (Porter, 1980). I utilized an estimation of assets, inventories,
and accumulated debt as measures of the extent of high exit barriers.

24

II.1.4 Pressure from Substitutes.
Substitutes are similar products that perform the same functions (Porter, 1998). In robotic
manufacturing, substitution consists of alternative minimally invasive surgical treatments,
minimally invasive non-surgical treatments, and traditional surgical approaches. Substitutions
generally limit industry profitability by placing a ceiling on potential returns when compared to
the cost of the next best alternative (Porter, 1998). I determined the threat level of industry
substitutes by examining the sub-constructs of price-performance trade-off and the buyer’s cost
of switching to the substitute.
II.1.4.1 Price-performance Trade-off.
This sub-component is the relative value of a substitute product or service (Porter, 1998).
In the robotic industry, price-performance trade-off is the relative value provided through
alternative surgical techniques, like laparoscopy, in comparison to robotic surgery. I used clinical
comparison data to evaluate the comparative value of open surgery and laparoscopy to robotic
surgery.
II.1.4.2 Buyer’s Cost of Switching to Substitute.
As opposed to exploring relative value, this sub-component focuses on the cost for the
buyer to switch to or from the substitute. Within the robotic surgery industry, this involves the
cost for hospitals to switch to or from alternative surgical techniques to robotic surgery. I utilized
capital cost, instrument cost, and procedural cost data to evaluate the deterrence of buyer’s cost
of switching to substitute.
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II.1.5 Buyer Bargaining Power.
Buyers compete with manufacturers for profitability within the value chain. Formidable
buyers reduce industry participants’ profitability by demanding lower prices, more expensive
services, higher quality, and other activities that increase manufacturer costs (Porters, 1998). To
understand buyer influence, eight factors must be examined: concentration of buyers, service
differentiation, industry purchases, backward integration, switching costs, buyer margins, service
importance, and full information (Porter, 1980 and 2008).
II.1.5.1 Buyer Concentration.
This sub-group relates to the quantity of buyers or the aggregation purchases (Porters,
1998). Buying in volume affords buyers influence over price, quality, or alternative terms. I
utilized data regarding hospital purchasing, groups purchasing organizations, and the hospital
industry to evaluate buyer concentration.
II.1.5.2 Product or Service Differentiation.
Similar to the discussion of industry rivalry, differentiation relates to uniqueness of
products or services for each hospital customer. The lack of customization increases buyer power
as buyers play one vendor against another for improved terms (Porter, 1998). I utilized product
characteristics to evaluate the differentiation between product offerings.
II.1.5.3 Industry Purchases.
What percentage does the cost of product purchases in the robotic industry represent in
relation to total cost structure, or specifically, to operating room cost structure (Porter, 1998)?
Buyers tend to be less cost sensitive if industry purchases represent a small fraction of total
expenditures. Since this is not generally the case regarding robotic surgery investments, capital
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cost, procedural cost, and recurring operating cost were used as a measure of industry purchases
in this study.
II.1.5.4 Backward Integration.
This concept represents the ability of a customer to credibly provide the product or
service produced by the industry manufacturer (Porter, 1998). Can hospitals manufacture and sell
robotic surgery systems? To answer this question, competitive activity and narrative information
were used to evaluate the ability of customers to create and distribute robotic surgery systems.
II.1.5.5 Switching Costs.
Similar to the evaluation of switching costs within threat of new entries, here I evaluated
switching costs involved with changing vendors (Porter, 1998). How well does the purchase
commit a buyer to a particular vendor (Porter, 1980)? In the case of robotic surgery, the purchase
of a robotic system locks a hospital into an instrument vendor and service contract. I utilized
instrument and system cost information to evaluate the strength of switching costs to influence
buyer behavior.
II.1.5.6 Buyers Margins.
When buyers experience tight profit margins or pressure to reduce costs, they tend to be
more price sensitive (Porter, 1998). Within the healthcare industry, hospitals are seeing
reimbursements decrease while cost of care is increasing. Consequently, the industry tends to be
price sensitive. I utilized hospital industry data and narratives to evaluate cost pressures of buyer
margins.
II.1.5.7 Product or Service Importance.
This construct evaluates the impact of the product or service on the buyer’s offering when
the offering is largely affected by the manufacturer’s product or in cases where service buyers
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tend to be less cost sensitive (Porter, 1980). In the robotic surgery industry, this is a measure of
robotic surgery’s effect on a hospital’s ability to deliver care or particular outcomes. I utilized
clinical data and narrative information to assess the importance of robotic surgery to a hospital’s
clinical offerings.
II.1.5.8 Full Information.
The more information the buyer has regarding the product offering, the greater his ability
to influence price and negotiated terms (Porter, 1980). In the robotic industry, manufacturers
largely drive disclosure. I estimated industry disclosure based upon published secondary reports.
II.1.6 Supplier Bargaining Power.
Suppliers also compete with industry participants to increase margins and profitability
through higher supply costs, quality of goods and services, labor costs, and other more favorable
terms (Magretta, 2013). To evaluate supplier bargaining power I considered the following six
factors: supplier concentration, supplier group dependency, supplier switching costs, supplier
differentiation, supplier substitution, and supplier credibility to integrate forward (Magretta,
2013).
II.1.6.1 Concentration.
If the supplier industry is less fragmented than the industry it is supplying, then suppliers
exhibit increased bargaining power (Porter, 1980). In the robotic surgery industry, this measure
fluctuates between necessary materials. For example, the 3D endoscope manufacturing industry
is more concentrated than the paper or medical drapes industry. I utilized product knowledge
specific to the robotic surgery industry and its limited manufacturers to estimate supplier
concentration.
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II.1.6.2 Dependency.
Greater supplier dependency on a particular industry weakens the bargaining power of
suppliers within an industry (Porter, 1980). If endoscope manufacturers only produced robotic
endoscopes, for example, they would have limited negotiating power. Since supplier volumes are
greater in general laparoscopy than in robotic surgery, bargaining power with robotic
manufacturers is enhanced. I utilized robotic surgery industry product knowledge, as well as the
importance of those products based upon product contributions, to estimate supplier dependency.
II.1.6.3 Switching costs.
In this case, switching costs measure the cost of robotic manufacturers switching
suppliers. As with other switching costs, the higher the cost of the switch, the weaker the
bargaining power of the entity contemplating the switch (Porter, 1998). I utilized robotic
manufacturer statements regarding alternative suppliers to evaluate the presence of switching
costs.
II.1.6.4 Differentiation.
In this context, differentiation refers to the uniqueness of supplier parts or services
(Porter, 1980). Higher levels of customization result in higher supplier bargaining power. I
utilized robotic manufacturer statements regarding customized parts and services to evaluate the
influence of differentiation.
II.1.6.5 Substitution.
Here, substitution relates to whether there is an alternative product or service for what the
supplier provides (Porter, 1980). The more applicable the substitute, the lower the supplier
bargaining power. I utilized robotic manufacturer statements regarding supplier alternatives
solutions to evaluate the influence of substitutions.
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II.1.6.6 Forward Integration.
Can the supplier realistically create the end product? Can the endoscope manufacturer not
only manufacturer the vision system, but also manufacture and sell a robotic surgery system? I
estimated the likelihood of supplier ability to forward integrate based upon supplier core
competencies, demonstrated capabilities, and corporate statements.
The topics of robotic surgery and healthcare are both contemporarily and socially
complex. The industry analysis not only supports the practicum of our recommended use for
practitioners, but this format also affords increased boundary flexibility to explore issues of
context based upon the vast and extensive nature of publically available information on the
industry.
II.2 Customer Value
In order to assess the customer value of robotic surgery, one must define the customer
and specify ‘what value is’ for that particular customer. As previously discussed, this research
defines ‘customers’ as hospitals. Although patients and surgeons could also be included, value to
hospitals inherently reflects perception of value to patients and/or surgeons. Representative value
for these stakeholders has been defined as clinical, financial, and strategic value (Table 4: Value
Framework Definitions and Criteria).
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Table 4 Value Framework Definitions and Criteria
CLINICAL

STRATEGIC

Revenue or cost
related

Organizational advantages

Outcomes or Perceived outcomes

Definitions
Criteria

FINANCIAL

Convert open procedures
Length of stay
Est. blood loss
Complications
Facilitation of transition to minimally invasive
surgery
• Patient Satisfaction
• Procedural Times
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Reimbursement
Instrument cost
Capital cost
Service cost
Program revenue
Program
profitability

• Recruiting physicians and
patients
• Market leadership
• Surgeon satisfaction
• Marketing

Based on the literature review, value was assessed based on the sub-constructs of core
benefits, add-on, relational, and transactional (CART) benefits. See Appendix 2: Customer
Value Definitions. The integration of CFS value, with emphasis on CART benefits results in the
CFS-CART Framework.
II.2.1 Clinical value.
This construct relates to the medical benefits or perceived medical benefits of robotic
surgery. Clinical core benefits are defined as medical benefits or perceived medical benefits of
converting open procedures to minimally invasive surgery (MIS) (i.e. patient benefits of MIS).
Clinical add-on benefits are benefits or perceived benefits of creating unique medical value (i.e.
patient benefits specific to robotics). Clinical relational benefits or perceived benefits are longterm or interpersonal benefits between hospitals and patients (i.e. patient satisfaction). Lastly,
transactional medical benefits or perceived benefits are short-term or procedural operational
benefits (i.e. procedural times).
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These benefits are specifically discussed in clinical articles and include length of stay,
estimated blood loss, complication rates, facilitation to minimally invasive surgical approaches,
and other general medically related statements. In addition to specific clinical benefits, clinical
value also accounts for more generally perceived benefits of robotic surgery. These perceived
benefits are generally mentioned in mainstream media publications, corporate presentations, and
hospital marketing materials. This construct allows the incorporation of relational and
transactional or indirect benefits (Grönroos, 1997) specific to robotic surgery. It also allows the
exploration of core benefits, as discussed by Menon, Homburg, and Beutin (2005). See
Appendix 2.
II.2.2 Financial value.
This component captures revenue or cost, or potential revenue or cost, related to robotic
procedures. Financial core benefits are defined as financial benefits or perceived benefits of
converting open procedures to MIS (i.e. lower treatment costs). Financial add-on benefits are
benefits or perceived benefits that create unique financial value (i.e. incremental revenue).
Financial relational benefits or perceived benefits are long-term or interpersonal benefits
between program stakeholders (i.e. program profitability). Lastly, transactional financial benefits
or perceived benefits are short-term acquisition and/or operational costs (i.e. robotic costs).
Exemplars of financial value include reimbursement data; instrument, capital and service
costs; and affiliated RSP revenue and cost data. This construct incorporates transactional value
(Grönroos, 1997) and purchase, acquisition, and operational cost (Menon et al., 2005) as reported
in clinical, mainstream and corporate publications. See Appendix 2.
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II.2.3 Strategic value.
Implementing a RSP is a macro-level decision implemented to support the hospital’s
strategic plan. Strategic core benefits are defined as benefits or perceived strategic benefits of
converting open procedures to MIS (i.e. attracting physicians and patients). Strategic add-on
benefits are benefits or perceived benefits that create unique strategic value (i.e. new market
leadership positions). Strategic relational benefits or perceived benefits are long-term or
interpersonal benefits between hospitals and surgeons (i.e. surgeon satisfaction). Lastly,
transactional strategic benefits or perceived benefits are short-term acquisition or operational
benefits (i.e. marketing).
This value construct captures the value related to the decision. Benefits or potential
benefits are exemplified in statements related to physician/patient retention or recruitment,
marketing or organizational branding, etc. as discussed in mainstream articles, surgeon or
hospital marketing material, and robotic manufacturer filings or corporate presentations. This
construct allows us to incorporate core and add-on as direct benefits (Menon et al., 2005),
indirect benefits (Grönroos, 1997), value creation (Smith and Colegate, 2007), and unique value
or rarity (Barney, 1991; Magretta, 2013; Mintzberg et al., 2005; Porter, 1980; Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990; Vandenbosch, 2002). See APPENDIX 2. These customer value constructs are
synthesized into the following expression:
Clinical (CART benefits)

}

CFS-CART Framework

+

Financial (CART benefits)

+

Strategic (CART benefits)

=

Customer Value derived from Capital-Intensive Medical Innovations
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II.3 Data Collection
While there are several robotic surgery manufacturers, the preponderance of this research
will be based upon a sole manufacturer because of its market dominance. This research is
particularly relevant since the leading manufacturer announced its newest robotic surgery
addition this year. As a result, many hospitals are considering investing in this new technological
offering while pondering the latent value within their existing RSP. Public data sources from
1995 through 2014 were utilized to structure a longitudinal study for the following periods:
Period 1 (1999-2004), Period 2 (2005-2009), and Period 3 (2010 – 2014). By Period Two, the
robotic surgery industry consolidated to a single firm. Though exploring a single firm can
mitigate the generalization of findings, an industry study can still be beneficial in illustrating the
unique benefits of a value system approach for hospital executives. Data was collected from the
following sources: government data, university research, mainstream media, company reports,
website material, corporate presentations, published earnings, analyst reports, industry
publications, and hospital press releases. These sources provide comprehensive analysis
including historical, attitudinal, and behavioral insight into the research (Mathiassen and Vainio,
2007).
II.4 Data Analysis
The general strategy employed for data analysis relied on theoretical proposition, with the
addition of an exploration of rival explanations to enhance this strategy. The units of observation
and the unit of analysis are the robotic surgery industry, relying on Porter’s model as a
foundation for these constructs, expanded as necessary to reflect the nuances and complexities of
a RSP and the broader healthcare arena. I used the constructs of CFS customer value. This data
analysis process will also conform to Yin’s principals of high quality analysis: 1) demonstrating
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attention to all the evidence; 2) addressing major rival explanations; 3) addressing the most
significant aspect of the study; and 4) the application of prior experience in the robotic surgery
industry.
In exploring the impact of industry structure on value, the research involves a cross
sectional look at the implications each of the 5-forces had on each value construct. For example,
the research considered the impact of industry rivalry on clinical value. Some of the tools utilized
to accomplish this task are Nvivo, coding, pattern matching, data displays, matrices, arrays, and
tabulated frequencies.
II.5 Limitations and Key Assumptions
While the research methodology seems plausible, there are several assumptions
and limitations worth discussing. First, this research does not include interviews or direct
observation regarding clinical outcomes of robotic procedures. There are over 5,000 peerreviewed articles, most of which discuss the clinical value of robotic procedures. The intent of
this research is to examine the vastly unexplored gap in robotic surgery value from an industry
perspective across multiple stakeholders. This gap largely relates to the non-clinical/outcome
specific data, and moreover, the programmatic or systems approach to RSPs.
Second, the research did not focus on physician training, surgical experience, surgical
technique, etc. While surgeon performance has direct implication on cost per procedure,
procedural time, program throughput, and other operational matters, I elected to limit the
research to public clinical data that may account for variations in physician training, surgical
experience, and technique. Cost metrics were derived from publicly provided information such
as annual reports, quarterly earnings transcripts, published articles, etc. This does not account for
nuances in programs based on size, geography, academic or community orientation, etc.;
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nonetheless, lessons garnered from an exploration of the industry data may prove useful at the
individual RSP level. I also based utilization metrics on publicly provided information from the
manufacturer. These metrics do not account for individual hospital team effectiveness, which
clearly contributes to team performance.
III ROBOTIC SURGERY INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
III.1 Period 1: The Introduction of Robotic Surgery (1999-2004)
III.1.1 Period Synopsis
III.1.1.1 Key Events.
On September 2nd, 1999, Dr. Robert Michler performed a robotic- assisted heart bypass
performed at Ohio State University, which was the first reported use of the da Vinci ComputerEnhanced Surgical System (Ohio State University, 1999). The robotic surgery revolution had
begun. In 2000, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the da Vinci robotic surgical
system (Figure 17: da Vinci Standard Robotic System) (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2000).
The next year, the U.S. FDA approved the ZEUS Robot (Figure 18: Zeus Robotic System),
manufactured by Computer Motion (Annual Report, 2002). Over the next six years, the robotic
surgery installation base went from zero to almost three hundred worldwide (Intuitive Surgical,
Annual Report, 2004). At the beginning of this period, the only industry competitors were
Intuitive Surgical, manufacturer of the da Vinci® Surgical System, and Computer Motion,
manufacturer of the Zeus Robot. Initially, robotic surgery was used primarily in converting
conventional cardiac procedures and/or prostatectomy to a minimally invasive surgical technique
(Computer Motion, Annual Report, 2002). During this period, robotic surgery was approved for
several procedures (Table 5: Procedural Approvals).
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Table 5 Procedural Approvals
PERIOD 1
PROCEDURE

FDA APPROVAL

General Laparoscopic

July 2000

Non-cardiac thoracoscopic

March 2001

Prostatectomy

May 2001

Cardiotomy/Mitral valve repair

November 2002

Totally Endoscopic Atrial Septal Defect

January 2003

Cardiac revascularization

July 2004

The key alternatives to robotic surgery were conventional open surgery or laparoscopic, also
known as minimally invasive surgery. The primary manufacturers for conventional and
laparoscopic medical devices at the time were Ethicon Endo-Surgery (EES) of Johnson and
Johnson, and Tyco, Inc. The main customers for robotic surgery systems were surgeons, as end
users, and hospitals, as technical and economic buyers. Lastly, key suppliers during this period
included endoscope and video equipment manufacturers (Table 6: Industry Participants).
Table 6 Industry Participants
PERIOD I
New Entrants

None

Industry Competitors

Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion

Substitutes

EES and Tyco, etc.

Buyers

Hospitals and Surgeons

Suppliers

Olympus, Panasonic, etc.
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III.1.2 5-Forces
III.1.2.1 Threat of new entrants.
As described by Porter, the threat of new entrants can impact industry profitability due to
increased capacity, price pressures, increased cost to compete, and higher rates of reinvestment
(Porter, 1980). What is the likelihood that a new firm will enter one of the robotic surgical
specialty groups to compete with existing firms (Porter, 1980)? To answer this question, one
must examine potential barriers to this scenario.
Regarding economy of scale during this period, several manufacturer reports contained
the statement, “We have limited experience in manufacturing our products and may encounter
manufacturing problems or delays that could result in lost revenue” (Intuitive Surgical, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). In 1999, only 12 da Vinci® Surgical Systems were sold (Intuitive
Surgical, 2000). While that number increased to 76 by 2004 (Intuitive Surgical, 2004), total units
sold during the six year period totaled only 286 units, making it difficult to significantly reduce
production costs based upon volume, resulting in higher cost per unit. Moreover, with limited
employees in sales, marketing, and R&D, and with only 321 total employees in the industry by
2004 (Computer Motion, 2002 and Intuitive Surgical, 2002), there were limited signs of scale
economies in the fields of manufacturing, research, engineering, or sales during the period.
Economies of scale served as a non-deterrent, resulting in thinner profit margins and contributing
to lower negotiating power with buyers and suppliers.
Demand-side benefits of scale or network effects did not serve as a deterrent. One
manufacturer clearly states the inclusion of network effects as part of its four point strategy, two
points of which include a focus on key institutions and a focus on leading surgeons to drive
adoption (Intuitive Surgical, 2000). However, there were only 286 RSPs and only 207 robots in
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the United States market of over 4,500 hospitals (Intuitive Surgical, 2004). Buyers’ willingness
to pay remained relatively flat during the period, with the reported average sales price staying
below $950,000 (Intuitive Surgical, 2002). Lastly, procedural numbers for the period were not
given. The absence of these numbers is an assumed indication of limited procedural experience
and a further indication of the limited developed network of robotic surgeons and RSP at this
point.
In a highly regulated industry, government policy can have a significant impact on sector
revenue. In its 2001 annual report, leading robotic surgery manufacturer Intuitive Surgical states
that, “our products are subject to a lengthy and uncertain domestic regulatory process. If we do
not obtain and maintain the necessary domestic regulatory approvals, we will not be able to
market and sell our products in the United States” (Intuitive Surgical, 2001:34). Although this
level of regulation may serve as a deterrent for some, it does not appear to have served as a
deterrent for other medical device manufacturers and healthcare organizations accustomed to
submitting product requests to the FDA. During the period, both major robotic surgery
manufacturers submitted and received approval for their respective surgery systems, multiple
procedural indications, and multiple instruments (Computer Motion, 2002 and Intuitive Surgical,
2002).
Historically, capital requirement represents the need to invest in large financial resources
to compete (Porter, 2008). By 2003, one manufacturer had an accumulated deficit of almost 140
million dollars (Intuitive Surgical, 2003), an amount that did not decrease until 2004, by which
time the company had invested over 110 million dollars in R&D alone (Intuitive Surgical, 2004).
This served as a deterrent to poorly funded subsequent investors. Given the limited adoption of
robotic surgery, switching costs were less of a measure of switching between two robotic surgery
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systems and more of an instance of switching from traditional or laparoscopic surgical
techniques to a robotic surgery technique. As a result, the switching cost included such factors as
the cost of acquiring and operating the robot. The average robot sales price during this period
was $930,000, while the average annual recurring cost was approximately $135,000. One
manufacturer attempted to offset this high switching cost with customer discussions regarding
market share advantages related to early adoption (Intuitive Surgical, 2001). Although switching
costs may have served as a deterrent for hospitals and physicians switching from alternative
surgical techniques, it did not serve as a deterrent for manufacturers considering entering the
robotic space, given the extremely low level of market penetration.
In 2002, Computer Motion had 79 sales and marketing personnel, and Intuitive Surgical
had 94 (Computer Motion, 2002 and Intuitive Surgical, 2002), for a total of 173 robotic sales and
marketing sales personnel across the industry. These sales and marketing personnel were
responsible for domestic and international markets, with both marketing and sales responsibility,
as well as the task of adhering to capital (buying a robot) and clinical needs (operating a robotic
program) of customers. By 2004, following the merger of Computer Motion and Intuitive
Surgical, that number was reduced to 140 sales and marketing personnel (Intuitive Surgical,
2004). During the period neither robotic manufacturer benefited from unequal access to
distribution channels. In fact, both companies shared similar international distribution channels,
yielding no competitive advantage or deterrent against newcomers.
Incumbency advantages independent of size were in their infancy. Prior to its merger
with Computer Motion, Intuitive Surgical held 70 United States patents, approximately 40
foreign patents, and outright owned 15 U.S. patents (Intuitive Surgical, 2001). After the merger,
Intuitive Surgical held over 100 US patents, 35 foreign patents, and owned 91 U.S. patents
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(Intuitive Surgical, 2004). The deterrence level was moderate for incumbency advantages
independent of size. The intellectual property landscape did not present much deterrence early in
the period; but following the merger, these entry barriers became more daunting.
With revenue growth from 1999 to 2004 over 1000 percent, industry growth was
exponential, which would not incentivize retaliation between Intuitive Surgical and Computer
Motion. However, Computer Motion had accumulated deficits of over 110 million by FY2002
(Computer Motion, 2002). Intuitive Surgical was running an accumulated deficit of over 100
million with cash and investment averaging less than 100 million for most of the period, putting
them in no position to conduct a price slashing campaign. Overall, the threat level to new
entrants during the period was low. The only threat of new entry criteria to serve as a deterrent
was capital requirements (Table 7: Threat to New Entrants Assessment).
Table 7 Threats to New Entrants Assessment
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Economies of Scale

Non-Deterrent

Demand-side Benefits of Scale

Non-Deterrent

Government Policy

Non-Deterrent

Capital Requirement

Deterrent

Switching Costs

Non-Deterrent

Access to Distribution

Non-Deterrent

Incumbency Advantages Independent of Size

Non-Deterrent

Expected Retaliation

Non-Deterrent

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW BARRIERS TO ENTRY
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Industry Rivalry. Regarding competitive balance, Computer Motion and Intuitive
Surgical were both relatively the same size. Comparatively, in the year prior to the proposed
merger, Intuitive Surgical had 290 employees (94 sales and marketing), while Computer Motion
had 185 employees (79 sales and marketing) (Intuitive Surgical, 2002; Computer Motion, 2002).
Research and development investments were only off by 20%, with Intuitive Surgical investing
$42 million and Computer Motion investing $34 million (Intuitive Surgical, 2002; Computer
Motion, 2002). Computer Motion partnered with Covidien, Stryker, and Karl Storz, while
Intuitive Surgical partnered with Ethicon Endo-Surgery and Olympus (Intuitive Surgical, 2002;
Computer Motion, 2002). As discussed earlier, the accumulated debt in 2002 for Intuitive
Surgical and Computer Motion was $128 million and $148 million, respectively (Intuitive
Surgical, 2002; Computer Motion, 2002). Much of this period was defined by competition
between equals, which intensified rivalry.
From 2000 to 2002, industry growth was approximately 118% as industry revenues grew
from $35 million to $78 million. During the period Intuitive Surgical experienced high revenue
growth of 1261% due to increases in system, instrument, and service revenue, with sales growth
proving expressly lower. Total growth rates by unit sales were 133%, 75%, 22%, 2%, and 25%
from 2000 to 2004 for Intuitive Surgical, with an average increase of only one robot sale per
month, while Computer Motion’s revenue and sales lapsed due to delayed purchases attributed to
delayed FDA approval (Computer Motion, 2002). The lower sales growth rates contributed to
intensified competitiveness between Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion.
Fixed and storage costs as illustrated by inventory and property and equipment were
approximately $18 million. Despite these cost, low sales volume limited pressure that may have
caused sales price to go below average costs. The lack of differentiation between the two
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offerings added to competitive intensity between Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion in the
period. See Table 8: Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion Similarities. This low level of
differentiation led to high levels of industry rivalry, as evidenced by multiple lawsuits (Intuitive
Surgical, 2002 and Computer Motion, 2002).
Limited information exists regarding Computer Motion’s Zeus pricing during the period.
Intuitive Surgical saw relatively flat pricing changes during the same period, with an average
price of approximately $930,000. There is no evidence of expansion leading to issues of
overcapacity. There is a low level of competitive diversity between robotic surgery
manufacturers. Regarding further similarities in product offerings, see Table 8: Intuitive Surgical
and Computer Motion Language, Font and Messaging Similarities. These similarities not only
lowered competitive diversity, but they also may have contributed to the subsequent successful
merger between the two companies in 2003.
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Table 8 Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion Language, Font and Messaging Similarities
COMPUTER MOTION

INTUITIVE SURGICAL

Computer motion, Inc. ("computer motion" or the "company")
is committed to developing, manufacturing and marketing
proprietary robotic and computerized surgical systems that are
intended to enhance a surgeon's performance and centralize
and simplify the surgeon's control of the operating room
("OR").

We design, manufacture, and market the da Vinci
surgical system, an advanced surgical system that we
believe represents a new generation of surgery. The da
Vinci surgical system consists of a surgeon's console, a
patient-side cart, a high performance vision system and
proprietary instruments.

As of December 31, 2002, the company had 184 full-time
employees including 79 employees in sales and marketing, 53
employees in research and development, 28 employees in
production and 24 employees in administration.

As of December 31, 2002, we had 290 employees, 54 of
whom were engaged directly in research and
development, 93 in manufacturing and service and 143 in
marketing, sales, and administrative activities.

IF THE COMPANY'S PRODUCTS DO NOT ACHIEVE
MARKET ACCEPTANCE, THE COMPANY WILL NOT
BE ABLE TO GENERATE THE REVENUE NECESSARY
TO SUPPORT ITS BUSINESS.

IF OUR PRODUCTS DO NOT ACHIEVE MARKET
ACCEPTANCE, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
GENERATE THE REVENUE NECESSARY TO
SUPPORT OUR BUSINESS.

IF THE COMPANY DOES NOT OBTAIN AND
MAINTAIN NECESSARY DOMESTIC REGULATORY
APPROVALS, THE COMPANY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
MARKET AND SELL ITS PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED
STATES.

OUR PRODUCTS ARE SUBJECT TO A LENGTHY
AND UNCERTAIN DOMESTIC REGULATORY
PROCESS. IF WE DO NOT OBTAIN AND
MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY DOMESTIC
REGULATORY APPROVALS, WE WILL NOT BE
ABLE TO MARKET AND SELL OUR PRODUCTS IN
THE UNITED STATES.

THE COMPANY'S PRODUCTS ARE SUBJECT TO
VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
PROCESSES AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS. IF THE
COMPANY DOES NOT MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY APPROVALS, THE
COMPANY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MARKET AND
SELL ITS PRODUCTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

OUR PRODUCTS ARE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY PROCESSES
AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS. IF WE DO NOT
OBTAIN AND MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY APPROVALS,
WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MARKET AND SELL
OUR PRODUCTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

IF SURGEONS OR INSTITUTIONS ARE UNABLE TO
OBTAIN REIMBURSEMENT FROM THIRD-PARTY
PAYERS FOR PROCEDURES USING THE COMPANY'S
PRODUCTS, OR IF REIMBURSEMENT IS
INSUFFICIENT TO COVER THE COSTS OF
PURCHASING THE COMPANY'S PRODUCTS, THE
COMPANY BE UNABLE TO GENERATE SUFFICIENT
SALES TO SUPPORT ITS BUSINESS.

IF INSTITUTIONS OR SURGEONS ARE UNABLE
TO OBTAIN REIMBURSEMENT FROM THIRDPARTY PAYERS FOR PROCEDURES USING OUR
PRODUCTS, OR IF REIMBURSEMENT IS
INSUFFICIENT TO COVER THE COSTS OF
PURCHASING OUR PRODUCTS, WE MAY BE
UNABLE TO GENERATE SUFFICIENT SALES TO
SUPPORT OUR BUSINESS.

(Intuitive Surgical, 2002 and Computer Motion, 2002)

The strategic stakes were high for both companies. They mutually expressed the
importance of market leadership in their corporate reports. “As the leader in computer-enhanced
surgical systems for minimally invasive procedures….” (Computer Motion, Quarterly Report,
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2002:13). Similarly, Intuitive stated, “We intend to maintain our leadership advantage by
continuing to develop and enhance our technology and to communicate the benefits of our da
Vinci Surgical System to surgeons, hospitals and patients” (Intuitive Surgical, 2002:11). The
strategic stakes were even higher for Intuitive Surgical, because they lacked the expanded
product offering available to Computer Motion (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2002 and
Computer Motion, Annual Report, 2002). The importance of this product offering contributed to
an intensified competitiveness. Both companies specialized in robotic or computer-enhanced
surgery and were highly committed to the industry. This commitment was exacerbated by the
high levels of accumulated debt, totaling $245 million in December of 2002. However, the
willingness to merge appears to have lowered the barrier to exit for Computer Motion. Overall,
the threat of intensified industry rivalry or competiveness during this period was high (See Table
9: Intensity of Rivalry Assessment).
Table 9 Intensity of Rivalry Assessment
INTENSITY OF RIVALRY CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Competitive Balance

Equal Competitors

Industry Growth

Slow sales growth

Fixed/Marginal Costs

Limited pressure to cut price

Differentiation

Little differentiation

Overcapacity

Not apparent

Competitive Diversity

Signaling clear, but competitive

Strategic Stakes

High

Exit Barriers

Moderate

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

HIGHLY COMPETITIVE
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III.1.2.2 Threat from Substitutes.
The industry focus for the period was to position robotic surgery as advantageous and
preferential in comparison to open surgery. The price-performance tradeoff for most procedures
approved by the FDA during the period represented the comparison to open surgical techniques.
Consider these statements from Intuitive Surgical’s annual report regarding the relative value of
open surgery in comparison to a robotic surgical technique.

“Radical prostatectomy using the da Vinci Surgical System allows for positive oncologic
results, reduced operative blood loss, less postoperative pain, improved cosmesis, and
potentially a better nerve-sparing technique. The da Vinci Surgical System has enabled a
large number of surgeons to convert from using an open surgical technique to a
minimally invasive technique” (Intuitive Surgical, 2004:10).

Regarding cardiac procedures, “Our system has already enabled heart valve repairs to be
performed through small ports in a manner that could not have been accomplished with open
surgery” (Intuitive Surgical, 2004:9). This focus on the transition from open surgery to robotic
surgery is also evident in customer statements. Consider the following quote found in HCA’s
annual report: “Surgical teams at select HCA hospitals use the da Vinci Surgical System to
perform a variety of the latest medical procedures, including mitral valve repairs, prostatectomies
and single vessel endoscopic coronary artery bypass surgery” (HCA Healthcare, 2003:3). In later
periods, clinical reports challenge the relative value of robotic surgery in comparison to
laparoscopy; but during this period, the majority of clinical references promoted on Intuitive
Surgical’s website were examples of open procedures switching to robotic (Clinical References,
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2014). The relative value of open surgery compared to robotics, for the procedures approved by
the FDA during this period, was low in relative value trade-off.
The buyer’s, or hospital’s, cost of switching from open surgery to robotic surgery is high,
with an average implementation price of $930,000. “Another disadvantage of these systems is
their cost. With a price tag of a million dollars, their cost is nearly prohibitive” (Lanfranco,
Castellanos, Desai, and Meyers, 2004:6). This does not include the escalating operational cost,
which grew from $84,000 per system for instruments and accessories and service in 2001, to
approximately $209,000 in 2004. One hospital found that “The da Vinci™ system, used in
telesurgical laparoscopic radical prostatectomy, would require an initial investment of $800,000
and an additional maintenance cost of $100,000 per year, adding approximately $1,500 – 2,000
to the cost of each procedure” (Holt, Zaidi, Abramson, and Somogyi, 2004:54). “Many hospitals
have found it difficult to invest in robotic surgery, said Dr. Jeffrey Matthews, chairman of
surgery at the University of Cincinnati Medical Center” (Bonfield, 2003). The cost of making
room for these robots and the cost of the robots themselves make them an especially expensive
technology (Lanfranco et al., 2004). The pressure from substitutes is low to moderate during this
period, because the focus remained on surgical procedures not as minimally invasive without the
use of the robot (See Table 10: Pressure from Substitutes Assessment).
Table 10 Pressure from Substitute Assessment
PRESSURE FROM SUBSTITUTES CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Price-performance Trade-off

Open to MIS comparison

Buyer’s Cost of Switching to Substitute

Switching to robotic surgery is expensive

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE
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III.1.2.3 Buyer Bargaining Power.
One manufacturer identified the potential impact of buyer concentration on revenue
during this period. One annual report stated, “because a small number of customers have and are
likely to continue to account for a substantial portion of our revenues, our revenues could decline
due to the loss or delay of a single customer order a relatively small number of customers
account for a significant portion of our total revenues” (Intuitive Surgical, 2000:28). This level of
concentration was evident throughout the period. As a result, this disproportionate impact on
corporate revenues gave early adopters of robotic surgery leverage in pricing, evidenced by
historically low prices in comparison to later periods.
As discussed earlier, differentiation between the offerings of Intuitive Surgical and
Computer Motion are limited. Product characteristics were utilized to evaluate the differentiation
between product offerings. Significant limitations in product uniqueness strengthen buyer
bargaining power between robotic manufacturers. With regards to industry purchases, hospitals
did not view robotic surgery as an essential service offering for patients and surgeons. This is
evidenced by the sale of fewer than 300 systems during the entire period, which was less than
average annual unit sales by 2008. Moreover, Computer Motion and Intuitive Surgical did not
have the option of selling surgical robots to industries outside of healthcare, which increased
hospital buyer power. The possibility of backwards integration, a surgeon or hospital
manufacturing and distributing a competitive robotic system, was highly unlikely. However,
during this period, there was evidence of Johns Hopkins University Engineering Research
Consortium exploring the possibility of backwards integration in robotics (Intuitive Surgical,
2000). Nonetheless, this option remains highly unlikely because it deviates from the core
competencies of most hospitals.
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Intuitive Surgical acknowledged the challenge related to switching cost by saying, “Our
success depends in part on convincing hospitals, surgeons and patients to convert procedures to
Intuitive surgery from open or existing” (Intuitive Surgical, 2002:20). With the infancy of the
installation base, there was little discussion of hospitals switching back to alternative surgical
techniques like open surgery or laparoscopy after purchasing a robot. During this period, rising
costs for goods and services accounted for a significant amount of hospital spending (American
Hospital Association, 2008). Additionally, hospitals faced cost pressures due to the rising
demand for care due to an aging population and other factors influencing increasing service
demands (American Hospital Association, 2008). “Hospitals pay close attention to costs, because
they usually receive a fixed amount of revenue per patient and must bear actual costs
themselves” (First Research, Inc. 2009:1). These tighter margins caused hospitals to pay more
attention to pricing, thereby increasing price sensitivity toward robotic purchases during the
period.
This period marked the introduction of robotic surgery into the marketplace, so service
importance was weak. “Our products represent a fundamentally new way of performing surgery”
(Intuitive Surgical, 2000:37). Given its newness to the market, during this period, robotic surgery
was not viewed as an important service offering or product for hospitals. The industry was
striving for acceptance, not standardization; “Achieving physician, patient and third-party payer
acceptance of Intuitive surgery as a preferred method of performing surgery will be crucial to our
success” (Intuitive Surgical, 2000:37). Consequently, the robotic surgery service line was not yet
of tremendous importance to hospitals, which diminished the manufacturer’s ability to increase
price.
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In his classic work, Diffusion of Innovation, Everett Rogers described the challenges
regarding the rate at which a new idea is accepted and promulgated throughout a community
(Rogers, 2010). This work is relevant to the criteria of full information. Rogers suggested that the
spread of innovation goes through five categorized customer bases with respect to market share:
innovators, early adopters, early majority, later majority, and laggards (Rogers, 2010). Hospitals
and surgeons that purchased robotic surgery systems during this period were largely innovators.
Typically part of the product development process, innovators often gain access to more
information. Within the healthcare environment, innovators often participate in both clinical
trials and the establishment of procedural discoveries and refinements. One innovator, Dr. Barry
Gardiner, San Ramon Regional Medical Center’s (SRRMC) new director of minimally invasive
surgery and principal investigator for the da Vinci™ Surgical System's FDA trials in general
surgery, shared that “The da Vinci™ Surgical System is expected to advance minimally invasive
techniques. This system is designed to expand surgeons' capabilities, improve their dexterity, and
give them a better level of control over their hand movements” (San Ramon Regional Medical
Center, 2000:1). This innovator role can result in increased bargaining power for the customer.
“SRRMC invested $900,000 in the computer-enhanced Surgical System, which is awaiting final
FDA approval” (San Ramon Regional Medical Center, 2000:1). This was lower than the average
sales price for the da Vinci system during the period. Overall, buyer bargaining power during the
period was high, which reduced the industry’s ability to increase price and profitability and to
negotiate more favorable terms (See Table 11: Buyer Bargaining Power Assessment).
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Table 11 Buyer Bargaining Power Assessment
BUYER BARGAINING POWER CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Buyer Concentration

Disproportionate impact on revenue

Service Differentiation

Zeus or da Vinci

Industry Purchases

Hospitals exclusive purchaser

Backward Integration

University study programs

Switching Costs

Few; inception of robotics

Buyer Margins

Low Margins

Service Importance

Not important service line

Full Information

Customers As Informed (Technologist)

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

HIGH BUYER POWER

III.1.2.4 Supplier Bargaining Power.
Suppliers also compete with industry participants to increase margins and profitability
through higher supply costs, quality of goods and services, labor costs, and other more favorable
terms (Magretta, 2013). To evaluate supplier bargaining power, the following six factors must be
considered: concentration, group dependency, switching costs, differentiation, substitution, and
credibility to integrate forward (Porter, 1980).
For certain products, there were few manufacturers that could supply the robotic surgery
manufacturers. For example, there were few companies that could manufacture 3D endoscopes at
the time. Due to concentration, these suppliers had a high level of bargaining power during the
period.
Due to dependency, suppliers did exhibit some enhanced bargaining power with robotic
surgery manufacturers. Computer Motion stated, “The Company relies on independent
manufacturers, some of which are single source suppliers for the manufacture of the principal
components of its products” (Computer Motion, 2002:11). Computer Motion recognized that,
“the company's reliance on sole or single source suppliers could harm its ability to meet demand
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for the company's products in a timely manner or within its projected budget” (Computer
Motion, 2002:37).
There are some products that robotic manufacturers found difficult to switch. According
to one manufacturer, “While alternative suppliers exist and could be identified for sole-sourced
components, the disruption or termination of the supply of components could cause a significant
increase in the costs of these components, which could affect our operating results” (Intuitive
Surgical, 2004:15). In an early report Intuitive stated,

“If we are required to change the manufacturer of a key component of our products, we
may be required to verify that the new manufacturer maintains facilities and procedures
that comply with quality standards and with all applicable regulations and guidelines. The
delays associated with the verification of a new manufacturer could delay our ability to
manufacture our products in a timely manner or within budget” (Intuitive Surgical,
2002:51).

These comments are indications of costly switching costs, which empowered suppliers with a
higher level of bargaining power during this period.
During the period, both robotic manufacturers stated “We purchase both custom and offthe-shelf components from a large number of certified suppliers” (Intuitive Surgical, 2003:17);
and “The Company purchases both custom made and stock components” (Computer Motion,
2002:11). Product differentiation from suppliers enhanced supplier bargaining power; “Our
reliance on sole and single source suppliers could harm our ability to meet demand for our
products in a timely manner or within budget” (Intuitive Surgical, 2003:49). While some

52

products may allow substitutes, there are other products without alternatives. For these,
“Shortages of raw materials, production capacity constraints, or delays on the part of the
Company's suppliers could negatively affect the Company's ability to ship products and derive
revenue” (Computer Motion, 2002:11).
Some of the larger organization could threaten forward integration. One report stated,
“We also face competition from several companies that are developing new approaches and
products for the minimally invasive surgery market… Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., a division of
Johnson & Johnson…” (Intuitive Surgical, 2001:16). Interestingly, Intuitive Surgical no longer
mentioned Ethicon Endo-Surgery as a potential competitor but referred to them as an alliance
partner the following year (Intuitive Surgical, 2001). Overall, supplier bargaining power during
the period was high, which decreased the robotic manufacturer’s ability to reduce costs and
negotiate favorable terms with suppliers (See Table 12: Supplier Bargaining Power Assessment).
Table 12 Supplier Bargaining Power Assessment
SUPPLIER BARGAINING POWER CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Concentration

Very Concentrated

Dependency

High

Switching Costs

High

Differentiation

Moderate

Substitutes

Few

Forward Integration

Possible

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

HIGH SUPPLIER POWER
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III.1.2.5

Overall Industry Structure (5-Forces).

During the period, robotic manufacturers faced the threat of new robotic system
manufacturers due to low entry barriers and attractive industry revenue growth. They
experienced an extremely high level of industry rivalry as Intuitive Surgical and Computer
Motion engaged each other through price, competitive alliances, and multiple lawsuits. Pressure
from substitutes was moderately evident. Robotic surgery served as a minimally invasive
surgical technique to perform largely “complex” surgical procedures. The vast majority of these
complex procedures could not be performed with alternative endoscopic tools; however, less
complex procedures could be performed laparoscopically. With the focus on complex surgical
procedures during this period, the strength of substitutes (alternative minimally invasive surgical
techniques) was moderate at best. Hospitals and surgeons had significant bargaining power
during this period, given the limited adoption base. Lastly, suppliers had tremendous bargaining
power due to the importance of their products and the need for customization given the
uniqueness of a robotic surgical system. Overall, the robotic surgery manufacturer’s market
power for this period was weak. See Table 13: 5-Forces Overall Assessment.
Table 13 5-Forces Overall Assessment
PORTER 5-FORCES

PERIOD I

Threat of New Entrants

Low Barriers to Entry

Intensity of Rivalry

Highly Competitive

Pressure from Substitutes

Low to Moderate

Buyer Bargaining Power

High

Supplier Bargaining Power

High

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

WEAK INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
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III.1.2.6 Predicted Role of Industry Structure on Customer Value.
Porter asserts that competition for profits exist between each of the five forces (Porter,
2008). Conventional wisdom might expect this competition to influence the overall value
hospitals may experience in their robotic surgery programs due to varying industry structures.
Predictively speaking, the weak industry structure of robotic surgery manufacturers during this
period should result in hospitals experiencing high levels of value within their robotic surgery
programs. However, the following analysis of customer value illustrates the three factors which
hindered hospital RSP value realization during the period.
III.1.3 Customer Value
III.1.3.1 Clinical Value.
The medical benefits for procedures during this period were influenced largely by
procedural complexity. Procedural adoption for robotic surgery began with FDA approval for
general laparoscopy in 2001 (Intuitive Surgical, 2004). This was followed by FDA approval for
non-cardiac thoracoscopy and oncologic urology in 2001 (Intuitive Surgical, 2004), to multiple
cardiac applications for FDA approval between 2002 and 2004 (Intuitive Surgical, 2004) (See
Figure 6 Period 1: Event and Procedural Approval Timeline).
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Figure 6 Period I: Event and Procedural Approval Timeline
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Procedure complexity supported the high core benefits of converting traditional open
procedures to MIS, including reduced blood loss, reduced length of stay, fewer complications,
etc. One clinical trial found that robotic assisted prostatectomy was a longer procedure than the
traditional retropubic prostatectomy, but blood loss decreased and patients experienced less
postoperative pain (Menon M., Tewari A., Baize B., Guillonneau B., and Vallancien G., 2002).
In 2003, the Vattikuti Institute released an additional study which found their robotic approach to
be “safer, less bloody and require[ing] shorter hospitalization….” (Tewari A., Srivasatava A. and
Menon M., 2003). In 2004, urologic oncologist Dr. Ahlering compared his robot-assisted
surgical approach to his traditional open radical prostatectomy. Exploring his 100 case
experiences, he found that his robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomies had the additional
benefits of minimally invasive surgery without compromising the oncologic and urinary
outcomes of his traditional approach (Ahlering T. E., Woo D., Eichel L., Lee D.I., Edwards R.,
Skarecky D.W., 2004). This experience was not unique to urologic procedures. Nonetheless,
robotic surgery was in its infancy with fairly little evidence or outcome-based medicine being
performed during the period (Figure 19: Citations). Consequently, the core benefit of robotic
surgery, converting open procedures to MIS, was moderately high during the period.
For cardiac procedures using the Zeus Robotic system, one group of physicians found
that robotic cardiac surgery offered the potential benefits of reduced morbidity, blood loss, and
hospital stays by reducing the need for a median sternotomy and/or cardiopulmonary bypass
(Detter, C., Reichenspurner, H., Boehm, D. H., and Reichart, B. 2001). While using the da Vinci
Surgical robot, Chitwood, Kypson, & Nifong stated “This system allows the surgeon to perform
complex mitral valve operations through small port sites rather than a traditional median
sternotomy” (Chitwood, W. J., Kypson, A. P., and Nifong, L. W. 2003:1) (Figure 20: Mitral
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Valve Port-site Robotic Approach). Given the high level of oncologic and cardiovascular
procedural complexities, the core benefits were equivalent to add-on benefits of robotic surgery,
because these complex procedures could not be performed in a MIS manner without a surgical
robot.
This procedural complexity helped increase relational value between patients and
physicians, as surgeons were able to improve patient satisfaction through less invasive surgical
techniques. Demand for robotic surgery was predominantly surgeon-led rather than patientdemanded. The relational value between patient and surgeon was moderate. However, the
transactional value of robotic procedures was mitigated given the difficulty surgeons experienced
in successfully navigating the challenges of the robotic learning curve. One article during the
period suggested that becoming proficient in performing robot-assisted prostatectomies requires
40-60 cases (Descazeaud, A., Peyromaure M. and Zerbib M., 2007). However, cardiac
procedures are even more complex and present steep learning curves (Bonatti, J., Schachner, T.,
Bernecker, O., Chevtchik, O., Bonaros, N., Ott, H., Friedrich G., Weidinger, F. and Laufer, G.,
2004). As a result, the transactional value during the period was low. Overall, the ability to
perform complex procedures in a minimally invasive fashion was the driving factor in offering
core benefits, add-on benefits, relational and transactional benefits for hospitals, leading to
moderate clinical value (See Table 14: Clinical Value Assessment).
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Table 14 Clinical Value Assessment
CLINICAL CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Core Benefit

Moderately High

Add-on Benefit

Moderately High

Relational Benefit

Moderate

Transactional Benefit

Low

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

MODERATE

III.1.3.2 Financial Value.
During the period, procedural complexity was a dominant theme that impacted financial value.
The potential financial value impact associated with these procedures demonstrated the benefits
of lower condition costs, increased revenue, and improved robotic program profitability, despite
higher procedural costs. The core benefit of converting open procedures to robotic surgery was
evaluated for delivering financial benefit beyond the operating room. For example, a review of
radical prostatectomy found,

“The costs of new technology are typically borne out in the first years of use and RAP
[robot assisted prostatectomy] is no exception with high robot costs for purchase,
maintenance and operative equipment overshadowing savings gained by shorter length of
stay. While RRP [radical retropubic prostatectomy] is currently the least costly approach,
LRP [laparoscopic radical prostatectomy] has proved to be almost as cost competitive as
RRP, whereas RAP will require a significant decrease in the cost of the device and
maintenance fees” (Lotan, Cadeddu, and Gettman, 2004:1).
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An alternative evaluation of robotic mitral valve surgery stated,

“Despite enthusiasm, caution cannot be overemphasized. Surgeons must be careful
because indices of operative safety, speed of recovery, level of discomfort, procedural
cost, and long-term operative quality have yet to be defined. Traditional valve operations
still enjoy long-term success with ever-decreasing morbidity and mortality, and remain
our measure for comparison. Surgeons must remember that we are seeking the most
durable operation with the least human trauma and quickest return to normalcy, all done
at the lowest cost with the least risks. Although we have moved more asymptotically to
these goals, surgeons alone must map the path for the final ascent” (Chitwood, Kypson &
Nifong, 2003).

Despite financial advantage of shorter length of stays, the high acquisition, instrument
cost, and cost associated with longer operative times mitigated the financial benefits of
converting open procedures (Lotan et al., 2004). Given the novelty of robotic surgery, on-going
operating cost and areas of potential savings were unclear. Some expected robotic surgery to
create savings by reducing the need for operating personnel (Holt et al., 2004). Due to the
absence of substantive evidence related to reduced treatment costs, the benefit of lower treatment
cost related to robotic surgery during this period was low to moderate.
By enabling hospitals and surgeons to create unique value, procedural complexity
contributed to increased incremental revenue during this period. The Cincinnati Enquirer
reported, “In 1999, Dr. Randall Wolf, then a heart surgeon at Christ Hospital, traveled to Europe
to become the first U.S. surgeon to use the da Vinci to complete a cardiac bypass. But Wolf left
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for Ohio State later that year after officials at Christ Hospital decided not to buy the machine”
(Bonfield, 2003:2). In the case of Dr. Wolf, “The team at Ohio State went on to grab several
headlines for advances in robotic surgery….” (Bonfield, 2003:2). This add-on benefit was
evident by hospitals providing unique service offerings, which stimulated patient awareness and
increased demand in high reimbursement procedures. Low level market adoption allowed for
bigger incremental gains but made those gains more difficult to realize due to the lack of broad
market adoption. As a result, the ability to generate financial add-on benefits was low.
Some proponents early on expressed a long-term program view of robotics, with a focus
on program profitability. Sam Gerszonowicz, an analyst from Brenner Securities, concluded,
“…if a typical hospital gets 15% profit from most medical operations, it earns about $8000 per
robotic procedure (Shields, 2001:18).” Although some may dispute the view of hospital
procedural profitability, the robotic procedures during this period were largely oncologic or
cardiovascular. These procedures experienced higher than average reimbursement due to their
complexity, however they received no additional reimbursement due to robotics (Binder,
Brätigam, Jonas, & Bentas, 2004). As a result, the relational value of RSP during this period was
low.
The vast majority of the literature during this period focused on the high transaction cost
of robotic surgery. At the time, the acquisition cost of a da Vinci or Zeus robotic system was
approximately $1 million, which does not include instrument and service costs (Darmiento,
2002; Intuitive Surgical, 2002; Chandra & Frank, 2003; Chitwood, 2003) See Table 15 Period I:
Acquisition and Operational Cost.
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Table 15 Period I: Acquisition and Operational Costs
ACQUISITION COST
DA VINCI
Stanford Report, 2000

ZEUS

DA VINCI

$100,000

$100,000

$875,000

Shields, 2001

$750,000 $1,000,000

Darmiento, 2002

$1,000,000

Intuitive Surgical, 2002

$912,000

Intuitive Surgical, 2002

$948,000

$1,000,000

Gerhardus, D. 2003

$1,000,000

$975,000

Chitwood et al, 2003

$1,000,000

$1,000,000

Binder et al, 2004

€ 1,250,000

$100,000

$1,600-1,900

Holt et al., 2004

$800,000

Lotan at al., 2004

$1,200,000

$100,000

El-Hakim and Tewari, 2004

$1,200,000

$100,000

Bodner et al., 2005

€ 1,000,000

€ 100,000

Ontario Health Technology
Assessment Series, 2004

ZEUS

PROCEDURE
COST
DA VINCI
ZEUS

MAINTENANCE COST

$800,000

$1,000,000

$100,000

$1,500-2,000

$1,500

$1,000,000

Most publicized opinions at this time expressed concern regarding the high price tag. For
example, hospitals like Christ Hospital in Cincinnati, Ohio took a largely transactional approach
and decided that the price tag was prohibitive (Bonfield, 2003). Nonetheless, the short-term goals
of purchasing a robot during this period varied and were assessed as moderate. See Table 16:
Financial Value Assessment. Overall, the financial value of robotic surgery during the period
was low to moderate.
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Table 16 Financial Value Assessment
FINANCIAL CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Core Benefit

Low/Moderate

Add-on Benefit

Moderate

Relational Benefit

Low

Transactional Benefit

Moderate

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE

III.1.3.3 Strategic Value.
Strategic benefits are related to physician or patient retention or recruitment,
organizational branding or marketing. The core strategic benefit of converting open procedures
to robotic surgery is to attract new physicians and patients. During the period Dr. Vip Patel
shared, “We thought we would maybe perform 50 cases a year with the robot, but now we're
estimating over 300 a year, and all because patients come in and say they want it” (PSA Rising,
2004:1). Ohio State’s ability to recruit Dr. Wolf during this period was an example of this
benefit. Also, Dr. Joseph De Rose, “the first surgeon in this country to perform a completely
robotic biventricular pacemaker procedure,” was recruited to St. Luke’s –Roosevelt Hospital (St.
Luke’s Roosevelt, 2014:1). Although some physicians and patients were recruited based on
robotic surgery, robotic sales, averaging little more than 7 system sales per quarter during the
period, marginalized the benefits (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Reports, 2000-2004). As a result,
the strategic core benefits were assessed as low.
The strategic add-on benefit of creating unique value equipped hospitals to capitalize on
new patient trends as patients and insurance companies began demanding less invasive surgical
techniques during the period (Shields, 2001). For example, Dr. Mani Menon, of the Vattikuti
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Urology Institute performed the first outpatient robotic prostatectomy in 2001. By the end of the
period, Dr. Menon and the Vattikuti team had the highest volume robotic series in the world,
performing over 2000 robotic prostatectomies (Henry Ford Health System, 2014). Dr. Vip Patel
shared,

“Robotic-assisted radical prostatectomy is not yet widely available. The da Vinci ®
Surgical System is frequently used by surgeons to perform heart surgery and general
laparoscopic procedures, such as gallbladder removal, treatment of gastroesophageal
reflux disease, and gynecologic treatment. However, only about 100 centers in the United
States and Europe offer robotic-assisted prostate surgery….” (PSA Rising, 2005:1).

During this period, programs like the Vattikuti Urology Institute and others were able to create
new positions in market leadership, though this was more of the exception than the rule.
Generally, the opportunity for hospitals to create new value during this period was moderate.
An early example of the ability of robotic surgery to recruit innovative surgeons is not
only an example of core benefit, but also an example of the technology’s ability to influence
surgeon satisfaction. This is representative of the relational value of robotic surgery. As
discussed earlier, Dr. Wolf left Christ Hospital dissatisfied because he did not have access to a
surgical robot (Bonfield, 2003). While Dr. Sudhir Srivastava, a leading robotic cardiac surgeon,
shared his satisfaction over Alliance’s $1.5 million purchase in 2002, saying, “the personnel
who pursued this at the hospital were fantastic, practicing day in and day out and backing a total
commitment by the surgeons to make use of the new robotic surgery” (Imbesi, 2007:1). Multiple
examples of the technology's ability to satisfy surgeons during this period were difficult to
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discover, which is not surprising given the level of adoption and acceptance. Overall, relational
value was assessed as low during this period.
The transactional value associated with a robotic purchase, represented by the immediate
marketing of the newly purchased system, varied. In 2000, Dr. Schauer of UPMC Presbyterian
stated regarding an investment in the Zeus robotic system, “no other hospital has yet packed
quite so many cutting edge technologies into one operating suite” (Spice, 2000:1). A 2004
Annuals of Surgery article summed up the transactional value offered by RSPs as follows:
“Robotic surgery is a new and exciting emerging technology that is taking the surgical
profession by storm. Up to this point, however, the race to acquire and incorporate this emerging
technology has primarily been driven by the market. In addition, surgical robots have become the
entry fee for centers wanting to be known for excellence in minimally invasive surgery despite
the current lack of practical applications. Therefore, robotic devices seem to have more of a
marketing role than a practical role. Whether or not robotic devices will grow into a more
practical role remains to be seen (Lanfranco et al., 2004:1).”
There was a moderate amount of transactional strategic value during the period. Overall,
the strategic value of robotic surgery to recruit physicians and patients, create new and/or unique
value, contribute to surgeon satisfaction, and influence hospital marketing was low/moderate
during the introduction period. See Table 17: Strategic Value Assessment
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Table 17 Strategic Value Assessment
STRATEGIC CRITERIA

PERIOD I

Core Benefit

Low

Add-on Benefit

Moderate

Relational Benefit

Low

Transactional Benefit

Moderate

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE

III.1.3.4 Overall Customer Value.
During this introduction period, robotic surgery provided stakeholders with low to
moderate levels of value, with value largely mitigated by limited market experience. There were
three dominating themes worth exploring: procedural complexity, transition to minimally
invasive surgery and validity of first mover advantages. As previously discussed, the procedural
complexity trend during this period increased significantly (Table 5: Procedural Approvals).
Robotic surgery has largely been understood as a technology with a focus on performing
complex surgical procedures in a minimally invasive environment. However, one manufacturer’s
annual report discussed the three ways robotic technology could forever change surgery, with the
third being “Simplifying Existing, High-Volume MIS Procedures” (Intuitive Surgical, 2000:9).
By 2003, the focus had simplified to transitioning complex procedures to a minimally invasive
surgical technique, which was evident by the growth in prostatectomy and cardiac procedures
(Intuitive Surgical, 2002; Computer Motion, 2002).
The same manufacturer removed the focus of simplifying existing, high volume MIS
procedures from their annual report (Intuitive Surgical, 2002). The transition to MIS in
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procedures that previously had not been successfully performed laparoscopically, like
prostatectomy or mitral valve, represented an opportunity to drive substantial clinical value.
These complex procedures were also associated with relatively higher levels of reimbursement in
comparison with other procedures with robotic approval during this period, like robotic
cholecystectomy. This higher reimbursement and associated complexity level facilitated higher
financial value and faster returns on investment (Gerhardus, D. 2003). However, the gains in
clinical and financial value were moderated by the difficulty of the learning curve and robotic
costs.
Comparatively, strategic value based upon procedural complexity was enhanced by
authentic market shifts due to early adoption. During this period, hospitals implemented robotic
programs largely driven by innovative surgeons, which contributed significantly toward industry
establishment. Historically, innovators aggressively approach new technologies; they are the
visionaries, the explorers, the customers that rejoice in the purchase of a new technology simply
because of its newness, independent of its pragmatic applications (Moore, 2002). Consider the
examples during this period, such as the FDA approval for the da Vinci® Surgical System,
followed by a trial led by Dr. Chitwood at East Carolina University (ECU News Services, 2002).
Also worth noting is the admission at UPMC that “the new systems do have a few bugs” (Spice,
2000:3), illustrating a willingness to work through early stage challenges. This period
empowered innovative surgeons to participate in the creation of an industry, an opinion
promulgated by manufacturers during this period:

“The current customer profiles are made up of early adopters that share the Company's
pioneering vision for these new technologies” (Computer Motion, 2002:57).
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“We believe these efforts will benefit early-adopting hospitals by increasing their market
share in the procedures and specialties that benefit from Intuitive surgery” (Intuitive
Surgical, 2004:8).

“We also train our sales representatives to educate hospital management on the potential
benefits of early adoption of our technology and the potential for increased local market
share that may result from Intuitive surgery” (Intuitive Surgical, 2004:8).

Early adoption enabled hospitals to capitalize on potential clinical benefits, moderate to high
financial benefits, despite transactional limitations as well as strategic opportunities. As Dr.
Lanfranco stated:

“In today's competitive healthcare market, many organizations are interested in making
themselves "cutting-edge" institutions with the most advanced technological equipment
and the very newest treatment and testing modalities. Doing so allows them to capture
more of the healthcare market. Acquiring a surgical robot is in essence the entry fee into
marketing an institution's surgical specialties as "the most advanced." It is not
uncommon, for example, to see a photo of a surgical robot on the cover of a hospital's
marketing brochure and yet see no word mentioning robotic surgery inside” (Lanfranco et
al., 2004:8).
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However, gains in strategic value had to overcome the difficulty of limited adoption and
procedural acceptance during this time. Figure 21: Marketing Robotic Surgery demonstrated the
efforts of hospitals to enhance, extend, and differentiate their surgical brands featuring surgical
robotics. In support of the CFS value that accompanied robotic surgery, over 300 RSPs were
implemented during this period. Overall the CFS value of robotic surgery during this period was
low/moderate. See Table 18: Customer Value Overall Assessment.
Table 18 Customer Value Overall Assessment
ROBOTIC SURGERY CUSTOMER VALUE

PERIOD I

Clinical Value

Moderate

Financial Value

Low/Moderate

Strategic Value

Low/Moderate

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE

III.1.3.5 Hospital Value Predicted vs. Hospital Value Assessed.
From 1999-2004 the robotic surgery industry consisted of a relatively weak industry
structure for robotic manufacturers, while providing low to moderate value for hospitals. This is
in contrast to the expectations of higher customer value, due to limited market power of robotic
surgery manufacturers. What factors mitigated the creation of high levels of customer value
during this period? As expected, the weak industry structure presented some opportunities for
hospitals to enhance value during this time. For instance, low barriers to entry, high rivalry
between robotic manufacturers, and high buyer bargaining power provided surgeons with the
opportunity to drive clinical value regardless of the manufacturers’ focused assertion. The period
began with manufacturers targeting robotic utilization in higher volume procedures already
performed using minimally invasive techniques. Due to weak market power, robotic
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manufacturers didn’t drive clinical usage; hospitals drove clinical application to procedures
benefitting specifically from robotic usage, despite lower volume instrument usage.
However, RSP value realization was hampered due to three factors: 1) Learning curve
challenges, 2) Healthcare reimbursement stagnation and 3) Limitations in market presence.
Clinical transactional benefits reflected the difficulty of the learning curve, which despite weak
industry structure, resulted in longer operating times and increased complication rates. Low
financial relational benefits reflected the adoption of innovative technologies in healthcare,
without commensurate changes in procedural reimbursement. Unlike other industries, in which a
firm can adopt a new technology and charge more due to higher value delivered, hospitals
increases in financial value were largely limited to cost reductions. Low strategic core and
relational benefits illustrate early stage adoption challenges. Hospitals were not fully able to take
advantage of the strategic value of a RSP during this period because the industry was still in the
first phase of the technology adoption curve. (See Table 19: Period I: Integrated Industry
Structure and Customer Value).
Table 19 Period I: Integrated Industy Structure and Customer Value
1999-2004

ROBOTIC SURGERY CUSTOMER VALUE
(HOSPITAL VIEWPOINT)
Clinical

Overall Industry Structure
Assessment
(Weak)

Financial

C – Present
A – Present
R – Slightly Present
T – Not Present

C – Not Present
A – Slightly Present
R – Barely Present
T – Slightly Present
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Strategic
C – Slightly Present
A – Slightly Present
R – Slightly Present
T – Slightly Present

III.2 Period II: The Rapid Adoption of Robotic Surgery (2005-2009)
III.2.1 Period Synopsis
III.2.1.1 Key Events.
In April 2005, the FDA approved gynecology for robotic usage (Intuitive Surgical, 2005).
See Table 20: Procedural Approvals. This announcement was followed by the introduction of a
new surgical robot, the da Vinci S system in January 2006 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report,
2006). The addition of this system and the introduction of robotic hysterectomy catapulted
robotic sales and procedural growth throughout the period. The period began with the robotic
installation base approaching 300, but during this time the installation base would grow by more
than 1,000 systems (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2009). In fact, robotic prostatectomy
would become the leading surgical treatment for localized prostate cancer, which would serve as
the first procedure where the robotic technique would be considered the industry standard
(Intuitive Surgical, 2008). This period would also see multiple co-development projects between
the robotic manufacturer and traditional medical device manufacturers in designing procedurespecific instrumentation. Near the end of the period, the United States endured a financial crisis,
a component of the larger global financial crisis and continued recession. This economic
environment contributed to the smallest incremental sale increase in robotic systems in the
history of the market leader (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2009).
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Table 20 Procedural Approvals
PROCEDURE

FDA APPROVAL
PERIOD I

General Laparoscopic

July 2000

Non-cardiac thoracoscopic

March 2001

Prostatectomy

May 2001

Cardiotomy/Mitral valve repair

November 2002

Totally Endoscopic Atrial Septal Defect

January 2003

Cardiac revascularization

July 2004

PERIOD II
Urologic Surgery Approval

March 2005

Gynecology

April 2005

Pediatric Surgery

June 2005

Transoral Otolaryngology

December 2009

During this period, there was one new entrant, Titan Medical incorporated. In terms of
FDA approved systems, however, there were no new entrants, which left Intuitive Surgical as the
sole robotic surgery manufacturer in the market. Substitutes to robotic surgery techniques varied
by procedure; however, they were largely represented by Ethicon Endo-Surgery and Covidien,
Inc. as manufacturers of both open and laparoscopic surgical instruments. Other treatments to
prostate surgery, such as brachytherapy, served as substitutions as well. The buyers for the
period remained hospitals, while the suppliers remained largely undisclosed with some
exceptions. (Table 22: Industry Participants).
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Table 21 Industry Participants
PERIOD I

PERIOD II

New Entrants

None

Titan Medical

Industry Competitors

Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion

Intuitive Surgical

Substitutes

EES and Tyco, etc.

EES and Tyco, etc.

Buyers

Hospitals and Surgeons

Hospitals and Surgeons

Suppliers

Olympus, Panasonic, etc.

EES, Gyrus, etc.

III.2.2 5-Forces
III.2.2.1 Threat of new entrants.
Overall the barriers of entry changed drastically from the previous period, as the sole
robotic manufacturer began to experience some economies of scale. According to corporate
reports beginning in 2006, “higher gross profit…was driven by higher 2006 product revenue …
lower product material costs and lower manufacturing costs” (Intuitive Surgical, Q2 Quarterly
Report, 2006:25). In fact, throughout the rest of the period, “instrument and system material cost
reductions and leveraging manufacturing costs across higher production volumes” continued to
be a contributing factor to higher product gross profit (Intuitive Surgical, 2009:43). There were
more robotic procedures performed in 2008 than from the period of 1999 – 2006. These higher
volumes contributed to lower margining cost, creating a higher barrier to entry through
economies of scale.
As discussed previously, the creation of network effects through leading institutions, as
well as a focus on key physicians, were two strategic points from one manufacturer’s annual
report the previous period. These points continued to be a part of the strategy at the outset of this
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period (Intuitive Surgical, 2005). One manufacturer reported, referencing these network effects,
“Some of the leading academic centers around the world have begun to make da Vinci standard
within these procedures.” (Seeking Alpha, 2008:5). In the first quarter of 2008, “117 da Vinci
related clinical papers published within the peer view Journals across multiple surgical
specialties” (Seeking Alpha, 2008:4) contributing to the establishment of a robotic surgery
network of hospitals. By the end of the period, there was at least one RSP in every state in the
United States (Intuitive Surgical, Investor Presentation, and Q4 2009). Over 1,100 robotic
surgery units were sold, many of which to surgical thought-leaders and key institutions. Unlike
the first period, where price largely remained flat, in this period the robotic unit average sales
price grew every year, equaling an approximate 32% price increase from the beginning to end of
the period. These enhanced network effects led to increased willingness to pay. Procedural
experiences increased as well, with over 500,000 robotic procedures performed during this
period. This further demonstrated extended demand-side benefits of scale.
Throughout this time, the role of government policy remained consistent. The sole
manufacturer introduced a new robotic system, but fewer new procedures were approved. While
surgical robotics remained a highly regulated industry, the market focus on robotics was not a
deterrent. However, the capital requirements became a deterrent as the industry sole
manufacturer spent 3 times, $270 million (Intuitive Surgical, 2005-2009), as much money on
research and development during this period in comparison to the previous period. Switching
cost served as a deterrent, which became increasingly stronger as the period transpired. At the
beginning of the period the robotic installation base was approximately 350 hospitals, but by the
end of the period the installation base had grown to almost 1,400 hospitals (Figure 7: Robotic
Surgery System and Procedural Growth) (Intuitive Surgical, 2009).
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Figure 7 Robotic Surgery Systems and Procedural Growth
Although there was no alternative system available during the period, the cost to switch
included capital cost, unused inventory, and service cost and training, which could be estimated
to be in excess of $1.8 million (average sales price plus average recurring costs) per robotic
system by the end of the period. Access to distribution actually improved significantly, with
approximately 500 field sales and service employees in comparison to 140 at the beginning of
the period (Intuitive Surgical, 2004 & 2009). With only one robotic surgery manufacturer
following last period’s merger, the additional headcount and monopolistic positioning created
unequal access to distribution channels. Moreover, there was a steady increase in advantages
independent of size due to increased procedural experience and intellectual property gains. By
the end of this period, there were over 840 patents or patents pending. Expected retaliation
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increased as the industry demonstrated a willingness to litigate in the previous period. Moreover,
the cash available to litigate had improved substantially as Intuitive Surgical achieved
profitability in 2006 (Intuitive Surgical, 2006), with cash balances exceeding $1.1 billion by
2009 (Intuitive Surgical, 2009). Overall, the threat level to new entrants during this period was
high (Table 22: Threat to New Entrants Assessment).
Table 22 Threat to New Entrant Assessment
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS
CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Economies of Scale

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Demand-side Benefits of Scale

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Government Policy

Non-Deterrent

Non-Deterrent

Capital Requirement

Deterrent

Deterrent

Switching Costs

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Access to Distribution

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Incumbency Advantages Independent of Size

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Expected Retaliation

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

LOW BARRIERS TO ENTRY

HIGH BARRIERS TO ENTRY

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.2.2.2 Industry Rivalry.
There was no industry rivalry during the period, due to the merger between Intuitive
Surgical and Computer Motion and the absence of a new entry robotic manufacturer competitor.
As a result, there was no competitive balance during the period as there was only one FDA
approved robotic surgery system in the market. There was a high industry growth rate during this
time (Figure 8: Industry Revenue Growth).
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Figure 8 Industry Revenue Growth
(Intuitive Surgical 2000 - 2014)

Consequently, there was no pressure to cut price due to fixed or marginal costs, product
differentiation, and/or the lack of competitive diversity. The strategic stakes for the sole
manufacturer remained high, as there was no market for robotic surgery systems outside of the
hospital industry. Lastly, the exit barriers did dissuade other players. Overall, the threat of
industry rivalry or competitiveness during the period was exceptionally low (See Table 23:
Intensity of Rivalry Assessment).
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Table 23 Intensity of Rivalry Assessment
INTENSITY OF RIVALRY
CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Competitive Balance

Equal Competitors

Sole competitor

Industry Growth

Slow sales growth

High Sales Growth

Limited pressure to cut price

No pressure to cut price

Little differentiation

Sole competitor

Not apparent

Not apparent

Signaling clear, but competitive

No signaling

High

High

Moderate

Low

HIGHLY COMPETITIVE

NOT COMPETITIVE

Fixed/Marginal Costs
Differentiation
Overcapacity
Competitive Diversity
Strategic Stakes
Exit Barriers
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.2.2.3 Threat from Substitutes.
As described earlier, robotic surgery substitution consists of alternative minimally
invasive surgical treatments, minimally invasive non-surgical treatments, and traditional surgical
approaches. The procedures that received FDA approval during this period were other urologic
surgeries, gynecology, and pediatrics. These approvals were unlike the prior period, when the
procedures approved did not have strong minimally invasive alternatives. Several of the
procedures approved this period, like nephrectomy, pyeloplasty and hysterectomy, had strong
laparoscopic options. These alternatives changed the price-performance trade-off from simply
comparing the cost of open to minimally invasive surgery, to evaluating both the cost of open to
minimally invasive surgery and the cost of converting laparoscopic cases to robotic. The robotic
industry navigated this change in substitution positioning by focusing on surgeons that had
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elected not to pursue a laparoscopic surgical technique and still performed open surgery, like
gynecologic oncology. Following the hysterectomy approval in April 2005, the manufacturer
announced, “We believe that the da Vinci Surgical System has the potential to address a
significant portion of the sizable hysterectomy market, specifically cases relating to cancer and
complex fibroid conditions” (Intuitive Surgical 2005:36). These cases represent oncologic and
complex gynecologic procedures more commonly performed with traditional open, not
laparoscopic, surgical techniques. Once again, the manufacturer stated, “Our goal is to establish
da Vinci surgery as the standard approach for complex surgical procedures, displacing both open
surgical technique and standard MIS within this segment” (Intuitive Surgical 2005:9). By
focusing on the complex cases, the industry improved the price-performance trade-off
comparison because complex laparoscopic cases were more apt to require the surgeon to convert
the procedure to open surgery. These complex cases also experience higher complication rates.
This became evident in physician published clinical trials highlighted during industry earning
calls, as stated by the vice-president of business development and strategy of Intuitive. He
shared,

“During the SGO postgraduate course, Dr. John Boggess from the University of North
Carolina shared his outcomes data for da Vinci Radical Hysterectomy, in which he
compared 50 Radical dVH's [ph] for cervical cancer to 50 radical hysterectomies
performed through traditional open incisions. His comparisons were pretty telling,
beginning with over time, which was 210 minutes for its dVH's, compared to 247
minutes for his open hysterectomies. Blood loss for his dVH's was 95 milliliters and 416
milliliters for his open hysterectomies….Dr. Lynn Kowalski, a surgeon from Nevada
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Surgery & Cancer Care in Las Vegas, presented a simple comparison and her radical
hysterectomies with the addition of transfusion rates and published her results in excepted
clinical poster. And Dr. Kowalski's series of 31 patients, she reported loss to be 182
milliliters with zero transfusions within a dVH co-work [ph], as compared to 415 and
three transfusions for her open procedures. dVH lymph node of 20.7, verses 16 for open
and dVH hospitalizations of 1.4 days, versus 6.1 days for her open radical
hysterectomies” (Seeking Alpha, 2008:4).

This clinical study makes the case for the superiority of robotic surgery when compared to
traditional open surgery for complex gynecologic cases. During the same earnings call the point
was also made in regard to the other substitute, laparoscopy. Consider the following,

“This analysis compared the outcomes of an initial experience with robotic Partial/Wedge
Nephrectomy performed by an experienced open surgeon to that of our standard
Laparoscopic Partial Nephrectomy being performed by two experienced Laparoscopic
surgeons. Their initial clinical results were as follows: the mean tumor size was 3.1
centimeters for the da Vinci Partial Nephrectomy patients and 2.3 centimeters for their
Laparoscopic patients. Mean total procedure time was reduced by an hour using da Vinci
to 228 minutes versus 289 minutes during their Laparoscopic procedures. Estimated
blood loss was 115 milliliters with da Vinci versus 198 millimeters during laparoscopy”
(Seeking Alpha, 2008:5).

This clinical study compares robotic surgery to traditional laparoscopy for complex procedures,
which became an ongoing practice during industry-related earning calls from 2007-2009.
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(Seeking Alpha, 2007-2009). Hospitals that firmly believe in the clinical value of the robotic
approach create a captured end-user market. This varies by patient population, procedure,
physician, etc. The trade-off becomes extreme once physician or patient is convinced of the
clinical benefits of robotics; in such cases, substitutes appear as less attractive and least viable
options.
The cost of switching to open and/or a traditional laparoscopic technique after selecting
robotic surgery became more difficult during this period as well. Robotic surgery involves more
switching cost to alternative treatments than vice versa. Consider the following cost that
surgeons and physicians must consciously switch away from when electing to return to
traditional open or laparoscopic techniques:
“The first cost includes the purchase price of the robotic system, which ranges between
$1,000,000 and $1,500,000 and requires a 10% annual maintenance fee for repair and
service as well as software upgrades to the system. The second cost is the procedure
disposable cost, which includes the robotic instruments ($200/use), drapes to maintain
sterility of the system, and a few other accessories and ports required to perform the
surgery that are specific to robotics. The third cost is the cost of training new personnel
and initial delays in setup time and procedure time during the learning curve. The fourth
cost is the expense of training and/or proctoring until the surgeon is certified” (Boggess,
2007:35).
The alternative techniques generally precedes the multi-million dollar investment; but once the
investment is made, there are political, financial and community pressures to legitimize the
capital purchase over alternative treatments. As a result, the threat of substitutes, following the
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initial investment, is low to moderate during this period. The threat of substitutes is higher than
last period as more procedures have minimally invasive alternatives. Nonetheless, the switching
costs of these substitutes are extremely high following the purchase of a robotic system. Overall,
the threat of substitutes during this period was moderate (See Table 24: Pressure from Substitutes
Assessment).
Table 24 Pressure from Substitute Assessment
PRESSURE FROM
SUBSTITUTES CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Price-performance Trade-off

Open to MIS comparison

Primarily, open to MIS comparison
Limited robotic to MIS comparison

Buyer’s Cost of Switching to
Substitute

Switching to robotic surgery is
expensive

Switching to substitute after robotic
purchase is prohibitive

LOW/MODERATE

MODERATE

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.2.2.4

Buyer Bargaining Power.

During the previous period, concentration of robotic purchases was disproportionately
reduced to a few key customers. This was last cited by Intuitive Surgical in late 2005 (Intuitive
Surgical, Quarterly Report, 2005) but was no longer the case through the remainder of the
period, as over 1,000 new robotic customers were added throughout the period (Intuitive
Surgical, 2009). Consequently, hospital and surgeon bargaining power became more consistent
with the limitations of a fragmented industry where “the top 50 organizations hold less than 30%
of the market” (Industry Guidebook: Healthcare, 2009). In the previous period, service
differentiation proved slight between robotic manufacturers; during this period, however, given
the single manufacturer position, service differentiation was absolute..
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The risk of backwards integration decreased. In fact, partnerships between robotic
manufacturers and academic institutions, like the one between Intuitive Surgical and the
California Institute of Technology, became more likely (Intuitive Surgical, 2007). Industry
purchases for buyers remained high, as robotic surgery manufacturers did not have alternative
industries to sell their products. Regarding switching costs, “The da Vinci Surgical System has
enabled a large number of surgeons to convert from using an open surgical technique to a
minimally invasive technique” (Intuitive Surgical, 2009:9). This increase in conversions also
represents an increase in switching cost for hospitals and surgeons due to the lack of choice in
the robotic industry. The buyer margins remained low as hospitals continued to struggle with
increasing cost pressures (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009) and the challenges of the 2008-2009
economic crises, which increased price sensitivity towards capital purchases like robotics
(Intuitive Surgical, 2009).
Unlike the previous period, service importance of robotic surgery increased substantially.
One article on the application and cost of robotic surgery stated,

“The most common application for robotic surgery in the field of urology is the radical
prostatectomy. The use of the robot for radical prostatectomy increased from 1% of all
prostatectomies performed in the United States in 2001 to almost 40% in 2006–2007.
More than 50% of all prostatectomies performed in the US in 2009 will be robot assisted”
(Leddy, Lendvay & Satava, 2010:101).

The absence of the leading treatment for prostate cancer would diminish the brand of a cancer
center, urology residency program, or community hospital in the marketplace. Near the end of
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this period the service importance of having a RSP increased significantly, which increased the
manufacturer’s ability to increase price.
In the first period, consistent with the work of Everett Rogers, the research observed high
robotic utilization by innovators. During this period, I saw the acceptance of the technology by
early adopters. Early adopters also enjoy the newness of a technology, but they are interested
more in the potential advantage that the technology offers, rather than the technology alone.
They are considered the pivotal customer to new technology markets, because they don’t require
references or the comfort of industry opinion; early adopters only need to see how the
technology offers a unique advantage (Moore, 2002). Because early adopters are less involved in
making a technical contribution to the technology, they are often less informed. Innovators were
involved in FDA trials, system designs and redesigns, etc. On the other hand, early adopters had
less information than innovators, which was reflected in decreased buyer bargaining power.
Overall, buyer bargaining power was very low for hospitals by the end of the period (See Table
25: Buyer Bargaining Power Assessment).
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Table 25 Buyer Bargaining Power Assessment
BUYER BARGAINING POWER
CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Disproportionate impact on revenue

Fragmented

Zeus or da Vinci

Single Manufacturer

Hospitals exclusive purchaser

Hospitals exclusive purchaser

Backward Integration

University study programs

Less Likely

Switching Costs

Few; inception of robotics

High

Buyer Margins

Low Margins

Low Margins

Not important service line

Important

Customers As Informed (Technologist)

Customers Less Informed

HIGH BUYER POWER

LOW BUYER POWER

Buyer Concentration
Service Differentiation
Industry Purchases

Service Importance
Full Information
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.2.2.5

Supplier Bargaining Power.

With many manufactured goods, a listing of external suppliers is not always readily
available; this may be an indication of limited supplier power. Conversely, in the computer
industry, it’s generally accepted many computers have “Intel Inside.” Supplier concentration
within the robotic manufacturing industry was assumed to consist of several firms. In a January
2009 Deco magazine article, Swiss Precision’s president commented about his firm being one of
many suppliers considered by Intuitive Surgical (Deco Magazine, 2009).
In this period, the robotic manufacturer remained dependent upon sole-source suppliers.
The manufacturer continued to mention this group dependency in annual reports (Intuitive
Surgical, Annual Reports, 2005-2009). However, it is not uncommon for robotic parts suppliers
to be more dependent on robotic manufacturers (RMs). For example, although the harmonic
shears were jointly developed by Ethicon Endo-Surgery and Intuitive Surgical, the robotic
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manufacturer also had the option of working with Gyrus on an energy based vessel sealing
solution, while Ethicon Endo-Surgery only had one choice of robotic manufacturer in which to
utilize its robotic instrument (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2005 and Intuitive Surgical,
Annual Report, 2006). Regarding switching costs, the robotic manufacturer expressed concerns
related to alternative suppliers throughout the period (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 20052009). Similarly, the manufacturer also continued to “purchase both custom and off-the-shelf
components from a large number of certified suppliers” (Intuitive Surgical, 2009:14), which
demonstrated continued product differentiation from suppliers and potential difficulty in product
substitution.
Although larger partial suppliers could still threaten to forward integrate, Ethicon EndoSurgery was no longer named as a competitor. Alternatively in 2007, Intuitive Surgical stated,
“We have formed alliances with, among other companies, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., Gyrus
ACMI, Olympus Corporation…”, which may have mitigated the threat of forward integration
(Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2009:12). Overall, supplier bargaining power during the
period was low/moderate, which increased the robotic manufacturer’s ability to reduce costs and
negotiate favorable terms with suppliers (See Table 26: Supplier Bargaining Power Assessment).
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Table 26 Suppliers Bargaining Power Assessment
SUPPLIER BARGAINING
POWER CRITERIA
Concentration

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Very Concentrated

Less Concentrated

Dependency

High

Moderate

Switching Costs

High

Moderate

Differentiation

Moderate

Moderate

Few

Few

Possible

Unlikely

HIGH SUPPLIER POWER

LOW/MODERATE SUPPLIER POWER

Substitutes
Forward Integration
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.2.2.6 Overall Industry Structure (5-Forces).
In this period the robotic manufacturer faced a limited threat of new entrants due to high
industry barriers to entry. The pressure on pricing from industry rivals was greatly reduced given
the absence of other industry competitors. The pressure from substitute offerings, such as
traditional surgery or alternative minimally invasive techniques, was moderate. Although the
presence of laparoscopy presented a credible substitute, the trade-offs to returning to open or
laparoscopic surgery after the substantial investment of time and money in robotics was
becoming less plausible. The bargaining power for hospitals decreased drastically over this
period, given the increased adoption and importance of robotic surgery. Lastly, supplier power
decreased as the sole manufacturer identified ways to become less dependent on sole-source
agreements. Overall, the robotic surgery manufacturer’s market power for this period was very
strong. See Table 27: 5-Forces Overall Assessment.
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Table 27 5-Forces Overall Assessment
PORTER 5-FORCES

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Threat of New Entrants

Low Barriers to Entry

High Barriers to Entry

Intensity of Rivalry

Highly Competitive

Not Competitive

Pressure from Substitutes

Low to Moderate

Moderate

Buyer Bargaining Power

High

Low

Supplier Bargaining Power

High

Low/Moderate

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

WEAK INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

VERY STRONG INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

III.2.2.7 Predicted Role of Industry Structure on Customer Value.
As industry structure strengthens robotic surgery firms have more control over the
direction of the industry, which could reflect in less hospital customer value. During this period,
the robotic surgery manufacturer moved from a weak industry structure to a very strong industry
structure. Porter’s model might predict that this resulted in lower levels of value for hospitals
within their robotic surgery programs.
III.2.3 Customer Value
III.2.3.1 Clinical Value.
The medical benefits for procedures during this period were an amalgamation of benefits
driven by procedures approved during last period and benefits experienced from procedures
approved during this period. This period experienced the extension of the core benefit of robotic
surgery, converting open cases to robotic. In the first period, this value was experienced
primarily in cardiovascular and prostate procedures. During this period, those benefits extended
to urologic oncology, gynecologic oncology, and hysterectomy (Seeking Alpha, Quarter 3,
2008). However, as discussed earlier, some of the high volume procedures introduced in this
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period, like hysterectomy, had a compelling laparoscopic alternative. As a result, the clinical
value remained high overall due to growing adoption, but the clinical value in transitioning a
laparoscopic procedure to robotic was generally less compelling than the clinical value of
converting an open case to robotic.
This period created opportunities for hospitals to experience add-on benefits as well.
Hospitals began to leverage their unique positions based upon their clinical expertise. By the
beginning of the period, the robotic prostatectomy team at Henry Ford Medical in Detroit,
Michigan had performed over 1,000 robotic prostatectomies (Hakim and Tewari, 2004) and Dr.
Randy Chitwood completed over 300 robotic mitral valve procedures by November 15th, 2006
(ECU News, 2006). As procedural experience grew, many physicians began to deliver clinical
benefits unique to robotics. Within prostatectomy, physicians demonstrated improvements in
urinary continence and erectile function (Ficarra, Novara, Fracalanza, D'Elia, Secco, Iafrate &
Artibani, 2009) in comparison to traditional approaches while also experiencing faster operating
times, reduced blood loss and reduced hospitalization in comparison to a laparoscopic approach
(Rocco, Matei, Melegari, Ospina, Mazzoleni, Errico & de Cobelli, 2009). During this period,
physicians began to compare robotic surgery directly with laparoscopic surgery, as evidenced in
the above citation. Although not directly stated in their corporate presentation, this was evidence
of a market return to Intuitive Surgical’s original strategy “Simplify Existing, High-Volume MIS
Procedures” (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2000:9). In 2008, Drs. Payne and Dauterive
published their landmark study comparing total laparoscopic hysterectomy to robotically assisted
hysterectomies (Payne and Dauterive, 2008). Their study indicated a higher likelihood of
converting to an open procedure in the laparoscopic cohort as opposed to the robotic cohort
(Payne and Dauterive, 2008). Robotic surgery demonstrated a high level of unique and/or add-on
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value, even in comparison to laparoscopy. At the end of the period, the following equation was
added to the annual report: Patient Value = Efficacy / Invasiveness, which was described as,
“Most patients will place higher value on procedures that are not only more efficacious, but also
less invasive than alternative treatments. Our goal is to provide patients with procedure options
that are both highly effective and less invasive than other surgical options” (Intuitive Surgical,
Annual Report, 2011:11). This equation is simply a combination of the direct benefits, within
clinical value.
These advantages also helped to increase relational value between patients and
physicians, as surgeons were able to improve patient satisfaction through less invasive surgical
techniques. Consider the following example, citing “high patient satisfaction with a minimum of
one year follow up” (Seeking Alpha, Q2 ISRG Earning Call Transcript, 2008), in reference to
robotic sacral colpopexy; and “with GYN meeting reviews… increased patient satisfaction were
common themes” (Seeking Alpha, Q4 ISRG Earning Call, 2008). The vast majority of robotic
applications during the period were for traditionally open procedures, resulting in a high level of
patient satisfaction and relational value for hospitals.
Transactional value also increased this period as surgeons became more comfortable with
the technology. Likewise, as early adopters grew in procedural experience, clinical trials and
publications regarding surgical techniques, complications, benefits, etc. became more prevalent
(See Figure 19: Citations) (Cecile C., Arnaud S., Mark L. and De Laet C., 2009). From 20072009, approximately 426,000 robotic surgeries were performed, and over half of those
procedures were prostatectomies (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Reports, 2007 – 2009). Consider the
fact that the FDA approved robotic prostatectomy in 2001 and mitral valve repairs in 2002. In
this period, many surgeons and hospital teams were going beyond procedural introduction to
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procedural mastery leading to reduced complications, lower blood loss, and faster operating
times. In spite of the proliferation of robotic surgery for certain procedures, the average number
of procedures being performed per robotic system dropped dramatically during the period. (See
Figure 9: Mean Utilization Rates).
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Figure 9 Mean Utilization Rates
The transactional value of robotic surgery actually increased to moderate during this
period as surgical teams became more comfortable, although the learning curve remained a
significant obstacle. The overall clinical value for robotic surgery during this period, despite the
introduction of less complex procedures, increased to high (See Table 28: Clinical Value
Assessment).
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Table 28 Clinical Value Assessment

III.2.3.2

CLINICAL CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Core Benefit

Moderately High

High

Add-on Benefit

Moderately High

High

Relational Benefit

Moderate

High

Transactional Benefit

Low

Moderate

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

MODERATE

HIGH

Financial Value.

Procedural complexity continued to be an important theme. The core financial benefit is
the ability of robotic surgery to demonstrate lower treatment cost when converting open
procedures to minimally invasive surgery. In published clinical trials, this benefit was discussed
across multiple specialties. In the Journal of Cardiac Surgery one group of physicians shared,

“Robotic technology did not significantly increase hospital cost. While the absolute cost
for robotic surgery was higher than conventional techniques after taking into account the
institutional cost of the robot, the major driver of cost for robotic procedures will likely
continue to decrease, as the surgical team becomes increasingly familiar with robotic
technology. Furthermore, other benefits, such as improvement in postoperative quality of
life and more expeditious return to work may make a robotic approach cost-effective.
Thus, it is possible that the benefits of robotic surgery may justify investment in this
technology” (Morgan, Thornton, Peacock, Hollingsworth, Smith, Oz and Argenziano.
2005:1).
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In an article in the Thoracic Surgery Clinics the author stated, “The average cost of VATS
[Video Assisted Thoracic Surgery] is substantially less than thoracotomy primarily because of a
decreased length of stay. The cost of robotic assistance for VATS is still less than thoracotomy,
but greater than VATS alone” (Park and Flores, 2008:1). Lastly, an article comparing traditional,
laparoscopic, and robotic techniques in robotic gynecologic oncology concluded, “the average
cost for hysterectomy and staging was highest for laparotomy, followed by robotic, and least for
standard laparoscopy” (Bell, Torgerson, Seshandri-Dreaden, Suttle and Hunt, 2008:1). These
articles highlight the financial advantages of robotic surgery when compared to traditional open
surgical techniques. However, the treatment cost in comparison to laparoscopy was frequently
higher. The core benefit assessment for this period was moderate.
Over this period, market adoption and acceptance grew substantially, thereby increasing
the ability to create unique value. There were roughly 1,000 clinical papers in peer-reviewed
journals written about robotic surgery in 2009, in comparison to less than 250 papers only two
years earlier. From 2005 – 2009, approximately 500,000 robotic surgery procedures were
performed. By then end of the period, there were over 1,000 RSPs in the United States alone.
Many hospital executives during this period began to see robotic surgery as an opportunity to
create a unique tool that could provide incremental revenue. The CEO of the Ford Health System
in Detroit said "We've seen double-digit increases in the number of prostate cases performed
since we introduced the da Vinci Surgical System" (Klein, 2008:1). The Sarasota Memorial
Healthcare Foundation raised over 1.5 million dollars from an anonymous donor for the purchase
of a second robotic system (Vim and Vigor, 2008). During this period, the add-on financial
benefits of robotic surgery to enhance revenue were increased by market adoption and
acceptance, rendering an overall assessment of high.
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Financial relational value based upon a long-term program focus increased during this
period. This was largely evident in the amount of robotic reinvestments made (See Figure 10:
Repeat System Sales).
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Figure 10 Period II: Repeat Systems Sales
(Intuitive Surgical, Quarterly Earning Calls, 2007 – 2013)

In October 2007, the vice-president of business development and strategic planning for Intuitive
Surgical shared, “Repeat systems sales included the Cleveland Clinic, Northwestern University
Hospital, the Lahey Clinic and Hackensack Medical Center. The sale to Hackensack represented
their fifth da Vinci system” (Seeking Alpha, Q307 ISRG Earning Call, 2007:4). In April 2008 he
shared, “… customer like St. Joes in Atlanta. This quarter they brought another system, that was
a repeat customer, in fact they would have bought their fifth system” (Seeking Alpha, Q108
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ISRG Earning Call, 2008:9). Consider the statements of Lonnie Smith, Chairman and CEO of
Intuitive Surgical in 2008, when she said, “I think the confirmation of the value-add of the
system is really reflected in repeat purchases. And those that have bought and had found success
and then buy a second system that's a confirmation of their satisfaction with their purchase and
willingness to do it again” (Seeking Alpha, Q108 ISRG Earning Call, 2008:9). By 2009, more
hospitals were buying into the long-term viability of RSPs. In fact, in Q3 2009, over 40% of
system sales were to existing robotic customers including “a sixth system to Methodist Medical
Center in Houston, a fifth system to Ohio State University Medical Center” (Seeking Alpha,
Q309 ISRG Earning Call, 2009:5). As the evidence suggests, the long-term program relational
value of RSPs improved to high during this period.
The transactional value, compared to the prior period, decreased as the cost of a robotic
acquisition went up. At the beginning of the first period, the average sales price for a da Vinci
system was $925,000 (Intuitive Surgical, Q105 Quarterly Report, 2005) (See Figure 11: Average
Sales Price).
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Figure 11 Average Sales Price
By March 2009, in the aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis, the da Vinci® Surgical
System was at its highest recorded average sales price to date, $1,430,000 (Seeking Alpha, Q209
ISRG Earning Call, 2009). These price points continued to increase throughout the period
supported by market adoption, market acceptance, and iterative robotic system product launches.
By the end of the period, transactional value for hospitals had decreased. Overall the financial
value of robotic surgery for hospitals had slightly decreased (See Table 29: Financial Value
Assessment).

96

Table 29 Financial Value Assessment
FINANCIAL CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Core Benefit

Low/Moderate

Moderate

Add-on Benefit

Moderate

High

Relational Benefit

Low

High

Transactional Benefit

Moderate

Moderate/Low

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE

MODERATE/HIGH

III.2.3.3 Strategic Value.
During this period, the strategic core benefit of attracting physicians and patients
increased from low to high. In 2005, Ohio State University recruited Dr. Vip Patel “to direct its
robotics and minimally invasive urological surgery program.” (AACI Update, 2005:1). Dr.
Sudhir Srivastava attracted patients from all over the United States to Odessa, Texas for robotic
heart surgeries (Imbesi, 2007). After performing over 800 robotic cardiac procedures and
becoming the highest volume robotic cardiac surgeon in the United States, Dr. Srivastava was
recruited from Alliance Hospital to the University of Chicago Medical Center in 2007 to become
director of robotic and minimally invasive cardiac surgery (Imbesi, 2007). The following year,
Florida Hospital announced, “Dr. Vip Patel has accepted the position of Medical Director of the
newly established Global Robotics Institute (GRI)” (Florida Hospital Media Relations, 2008:1).
Not only did Florida Hospital recruit one of the highest volume surgeons in the world, with
approximately 2,000 cases performed, but they lauded that Dr. Patel “leads one of the world's
most experienced robotic surgery teams, which will now join him in Central Florida” (Florida
Hospital Media Relations, 2008:1). Dr. Patel’s entire team was recruited. In November 2009,
97

Florida Hospital published the following press release:

“Florida Hospital Celebration Health Welcomes Dr. Arnold Advincula
Gynecological Robotic Surgery Specialist First In World To Perform Robotic Myomectomy”
(Florida Hospital Media Relations, 2009:1).

Clearly, investments in robotic surgery had demonstrated a high level of ability to recruit
surgeons and patients.
During this period, hospital systems achieved new market leadership positions through
the creation of unique value. Odessa, Texas became one of the primary robotic surgery training
centers entertaining over 150 doctors from around the world interested in robotic heart surgery
(Imbesi, 2007). Saint Josephs of Atlanta initially purchased the da Vinci robot in 2002 and
became the first in the world to purchase the da Vinci in pursuit of becoming “A World Leader
in Robotic Surgery” (Health Care 2017: Envisioning Our Future 2006:13) At the same time,
Florida Hospital grew from acquiring a robotic surgery system in 2004 to establishing the Global
Robotic Institute (Florida Hospital Media Relations, 2008). The strategic add-on benefit of
creating unique value remained moderate during this period.
The relational aspect of robotic surgery strengthened during this period. To more
physicians, an investment in robotic surgery represented an investment in the hospital surgeon
relationship. This is best illustrated through physician recruitment related to robotic surgery, the
increased number of procedures performed, and the increase in clinical studies performed in
relation to robotic surgery. As generation X and millennials became the dominant surgeon
population, the existence of a RSP equated with being a high-tech hospital (Maccracken, Pickens
and Wells, 2009). Overall, the relational value of having a RSP during this period was moderate.
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Lastly, strategic transactional value is related to the short-term strategic benefits of a
RSP, which is best demonstrated through marketing. The marketing value of robotic surgery
during the period increased dramatically. Dr. Saliba, senior vice-president of marketing and
planning for Florida Hospital, discussed the impact of marketing their RSP on the web (Saliba,
2009). The mix of Florida Hospital’s direct, interactive, and physician robotic surgery marketing
campaign led to higher surgery volume trends than expected for every month of the following
year, as well as shifts in market share from 5.9% in 2007 to 36.4% in 2008, measured from
January – June (Saliba, 2009). Alternatively, there were opinions that much of the growth in
robotic surgery was attributed to marketing rather than clinical benefits. Consider the following:
“Between 2001 and 2008, robotically assisted minimally invasive prostate surgery jumped from
1% of all procedures to up to 60%, largely because of direct-to-consumer marketing…” (Fauber,
2009:1). The high transactional value of robotic surgery in support of strategic marketing efforts
was not challenged, though the appropriateness of such marketing was questioned, which carried
into the next period. Overall, the strategic value of robotic surgery for the period increased from
low/moderate to high. See Table 30: Strategic Value Assessment.
Table 30 Strategic Value Assessment
STRATEGIC CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Core Benefit

Low

High

Add-on Benefit

Moderate

Moderate

Relational Benefit

Low

High

Transactional Benefit

Moderate

High

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE

HIGH
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III.2.3.4 Overall Customer Value.
During this period, acceptance was the predominant theme driving robotic surgery
customer value from low/moderate to moderate/high due to increases in hospital robotic surgery
experience. This acknowledgment of robotic surgery was clearly evident at surgical meetings.
According to one corporate synopsis of a urology annual meeting,

“The agenda at this year’s AUA Conference held in Chicago was a Da Vinci testimonial
in and of itself. Presentations, clinical abstracts, live surgeries, postgraduate robotic
courses, and booth presentations dominated this year’s conference. The mass global
appeal of da Vinci-based procedures within the specialty of urology is truly material.
During the 4-day conference, we registered over 1000 urologists at our booth,
representing nearly 40 countries” (Intuitive Surgical, Q2 Quarterly Report, 2009:6).

Independent of whether the increase in experience was clinically justified or not, it was
happening; and as it did, hospital executives were forced to make tough decisions. Consider the
following blog post from Paul Levy, former President and CEO of Beth Israel Deaconess
Medical Center,

“Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of enhanced clinical efficacy, I have been advised
the following by one of our leading doctors: ‘Due to market forces beyond any of our
control, the unfortunate reality is that without a da Vinci robot, BIDMC prostatectomy
volume would likely plummet by 2010 and BIDMC would consequently quickly become
a non-entity in regional prostate cancer care. This would have dire consequences for
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BIDMC clinical urology, radiology, radiation oncology, medical oncology, as well as for
research in translational oncology. It is unlikely that [we can] fully gauge the breadth and
depth of collateral damage that absence of a da Vinci robot would bring to our medical
center’” (Levy, 2007).

Despite the bantering between robotic proponents and antagonists regarding clinical and
financial value, the market forces behind the strategic value of robotic surgery were undisputed.
As one physician put it, “I guarantee you that robotic surgery is going to become the
standard…all hospitals will have it in the next 10 years because patients want the best, and so
hospitals will either have it or lose patients” (Georgia Trend, 2008:1). See Table 31: Customer
Value Overall Assessment.
Table 31 Costumer Value Overall Assessment
ROBOTIC SURGERY CUSTOMER VALUE

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

Clinical Value

Moderate

High

Financial Value

Low/Moderate

Moderate/High

Strategic Value

Low/Moderate

High

LOW/MODERATE

MODERATE/HIGH

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.2.3.5 Hospital Value Predicted vs. Hospital Value Assessed.
From 2005-2009 the robotic surgery industry transition from a relatively weak industry
structure from the previous period to a strong industry structure. Once again, contrary to the
prediction based on industry structure hospital RSP value increased in all facets during this
period. This was largely driven by three dominant themes: 1) Holistic increases in clinical value
or perceived clinical value, 2) Greatly enhanced financial relational and add-on benefits and 3)
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Improved strategic core and relational benefits. Clinically, this period saw the extension of the
benefit to robotic prostatectomy becoming the number one surgical treatment for prostate cancer
and the extension of those benefits to additional procedures like nephrectomies and
hysterectomies. Hospitals’ ability to create unique value, specific to robotic surgery, increased
during the period as physicians gained more robotic surgery experience. The perception of
financial add-on benefits, hospitals ability to create unique financial value through RSP,
increased significantly in comparison to the previous period. This perception was apparent in the
number of hospitals (over 240) that elected to re-invest in robotic surgery systems during the
period. Contrary to prediction, the change in industry structure improved the strategic value of a
RSP. As industry barriers and competitiveness increased for the manufacturer, the strategic value
for hospitals became more valuable as well. Industry collective messaging in the importance of
converting open surgery to MIS provided a strategic core benefit to new and existing RSPs.
Traditional surgical techniques were paling in comparison to robotic surgery’s ability to create
unique value and new market leaders. See Table 32 Period II: Integrated Industry Structure and
Customer Value.
Table 32 Period II: Industry Structure and Customer Value
2005-2009

ROBOTIC SURGERY CUSTOMER VALUE
(HOSPITAL VIEWPOINT)
Clinical

Overall Industry Structure Assessment
(Very Strong)

C – Present
A – Present
R – Present
T – Slightly Present
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Financial
C – Barely Present
A – Slightly Present
R – Barely Present
T – Barely Present

Strategic
C – Slightly Present
A – Slightly Present
R – Slightly Present
T – Slightly Present

III.3 Period III: The Establishment of Robotic Surgery (2010 -2014)
III.3.1 Period Synopsis
III.3.1.1 Key Events.
The third period saw the establishment of robotic surgery as a permanent offering of
modern healthcare. By the end of 2010, hysterectomy replaced prostatectomy as the highest
volume robotic procedure performed. This period saw the introduction of key complementary
products to enhance the surgeon robotic surgery experience, such as training simulators,
advanced imaging, stapling/vessel sealing products, and single-site technology. Until this period,
the focus of robotic surgery was converting open surgery to MIS; however, during this period
there was an unprecedented increase in robotic usage in non-complex procedures. See Table 33:
Procedural Approvals. In the face of advancements, this period was also fraught with national
criticism regarding aggressive marketing, FDA warnings, voluntary recalls, lawsuits, and
insistent competitive substitutes. The period was mixed with dramatic success, ranging from the
largest increase in total system sales from one year to the next (Intuitive Surgical, 2010) to the
disappointment exemplified in the first total system decrease in industry sales (Intuitive Surgical,
2013).
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Table 33 Procedural Approvals
PROCEDURE

FDA APPROVAL
PERIOD I

General Laparoscopic

July 2000

Non-cardiac thoracoscopic

March 2001

Prostatectomy

May 2001

Cardiotomy/Mitral valve repair

November 2002

Totally Endoscopic Atrial Septal Defect

January 2003

Cardiac revascularization

July 2004

PERIOD II
Urologic Surgery Approval

March 2005

Gynecology

April 2005

Pediatric Surgery

June 2005

Transoral Otolaryngolgoy

December 2009

PERIOD III
Single-Site Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy

December 2011

Single-Site Benign Hysterectomy

February 2013

During this period, TransEnterix entered into the robotic surgery market. Like Titan
Medical, the FDA has yet to approve its robotic surgery system. Consequently, there are no
competitive robotic systems in the market, maintaining Intuitive Surgical’s position as market
leader, with its da Vinci System remaining the sole robotic surgery system approved for broad
application. During this period laparoscopic substitutes to robotic surgery, primarily
manufactured by Ethicon Endo-Surgery and Covidien, Inc, became increasingly competitive.
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The buyers for the period remained hospitals, while the suppliers remained largely undisclosed
with some exceptions.(Table 34: Industry Participants).
Table 34 Industry Participants
PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

New Entrants

None

Titan Medical

Titan Medical &
TransEnterix

Industry
Competitors

Intuitive Surgical and
Computer Motion

Intuitive Surgical

Intuitive Surgical

Substitutes

EES and Tyco, etc.

EES and Tyco, etc.

EES and Tyco, etc.

Hospitals and Surgeons

Hospitals and
Surgeons

Hospitals and Surgeons

Olympus, Panasonic, etc.

EES, Gyrus, etc.

Mimic, etc.

Buyers
Suppliers

III.3.2 5-Forces
III.3.2.1 Threat of new entrants.
At the beginning of the period economy of scale benefits were clearly present. “The
increase in gross margin compared to the prior year reflect increased system ASPs [Average
Sales Prices], material cost reductions and absorption of fixed costs over a larger revenue base”
(Seeking Alpha, 2010:5). Demand-side benefits of scale continued to be a deterrent as well, with
an installation base of over 3,000 systems, average sales pricing of $1.52 million, and cumulative
procedural numbers approaching 2 million in this period (Intuitive Surgical, Investor
Presentation, Q2 2014 and Intuitive Surgical, Annual Reports, 2010-2013). Government policy
may have become more of a deterrent during the period, as the leading manufacturer experienced
an FDA investigation (The Advisory Board Company, 2013) and subsequent FDA Warning
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Letter (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013). The increased regulatory environment on
surgical robotics may actually serve as a deterrent for new entrants, due to the increased intrusion
and regulatory expense. As in the previous period, research and development costs continued to
increase, peaking at $170 million in 2012 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2012). Switching
costs continued to increase due to resources invested into implementation, operations,
inventories, and on-going service obligations. Additionally, by this period, hundreds of hospitals
performed over 1,000 robotic procedures (Google Search, 2014). Access to distribution
continued to increase significantly as clinical and capital sales increased over 70% from 2009 to
2013 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Reports, 2009 & 2013). Incumbency advantages independent of
size increased dramatically in this period, in comparison to last period, beginning with an
increase in patents and patents pending from 840 in 2009 to 1800 by the end of 2010 (Intuitive
Surgical, Annual Reports, 2009 & 2010). This intellectual property position advanced to 3,000
U.S. and foreign patents by October 2014 (Intuitive Surgical, Investor Presentation, Q3 2014).
Lastly, the ability of the leading manufacturer to retaliate also increased during this period, with
cash reserves approaching $3 billion in 2012 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2012). Overall,
the barriers to entry for new entrants increased during this period. (Table 35: Threat to New
Entrants Assessment).
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Table 35 Threat to New Entrants Assessment
THREAT OF NEW
ENTRANTS CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Economies of Scale

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

Demand-side Benefits of
Scale

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

Government Policy

Non-Deterrent

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Capital Requirement

Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

Switching Costs

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

Access to Distribution

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

Incumbency Advantages
Independent of Size

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

Expected Retaliation

Non-Deterrent

Deterrent

Deterrent

LOW BARRIERS TO
ENTRY

HIGH BARRIERS TO
ENTRY

HIGH BARRIERS TO
ENTRY

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.3.2.2 Industry Rivalry.
Once again there was no industry rivalry during the period, due to the lack of FDA
approved systems in the market other than the da Vinci® Surgical Systems. In addition to Titan
Medical, Inc., TransEnterix began their development of a surgical robot in 2012 (TransEnterix,
2014). Given the lack of a competitive robotic system in the market, there is no competitive
balance in the industry, and industry growth rates continued to climb during the period (Figure 8:
Industry Revenue Growth). Despite the high fixed cost, “Lower system production volume
resulted in a higher amount of fixed manufacturing costs being expensed…” there was little
downward pricing pressure (Intuitive Surgical, Q2 Quarterly Report, 2014:2). Once again, there
was no pressure to cut price due to fixed or marginal costs, product differentiation, or the lack of
competitive diversity. The strategic stakes for the incumbent remained high, because there was
no market for the surgical system outside of healthcare. Overall, the threat of industry rivalry or
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competitiveness during the period was exceptionally low (See Table 36: Intensity of Rivalry
Assessment).
Table 36 Intensity of Rivalry Assessment
INTENSITY OF
RIVALRY CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Competitive Balance

Equal competitors

Sole competitor

Sole competitor

Slow sales growth

High Sales Growth

Limited pressure to cut
price
Little differentiation

No pressure to cut
price
Sole competitor

Slowed new customer
growth
No pressure to cut price

Not apparent

Not apparent

Not apparent

Signaling clear, but
competitive
High

No signaling

No signaling

High

High

Exit Barriers

Moderate

Low

N/A

OVERALL
ASSESSMENT

HIGHLY COMPETITIVE

NOT COMPETITIVE

NOT COMPETITIVE

Industry Growth
Fixed/Marginal Costs
Differentiation
Overcapacity
Competitive Diversity
Strategic Stakes

Sole competitor

III.3.2.3 Threat from Substitutes.
Robotic manufacturers began with a vision of not only converting open cases to MIS, but
converting MIS to robotic surgery as well. This was evident in 2000, when one robotic
manufacturer stated, “We believe that our technology has the potential to change surgical
procedures in three basic ways…Convert Open Procedures to Intuitive Surgery…Facilitate
Difficult MIS Operations…. Simplify Existing, High-Volume MIS Procedures” (Intuitive
Surgical, Annual Report, 2002:9). It is interesting how closely these objectives are affiliated with
the three periods. From 1999-2004, robotic surgery positioned open surgery as the most
competitive substitute. As a result, “It was reported that in 2009 more than 85% of men
undergoing RP had robotic surgery” (Makarov, James, Desai, Penson, & Gross, 2011). From
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2005-2009, robotic surgery positioned open surgery and difficult MIS operations as the
competitive substitute.
In the last period, robotic surgery positioned high volume MIS procedures as the most
competitive substitute. This was evident in several ways. First, the only two robotic procedures
approved this period by the FDA were single-site laparoscopic cholecystectomy and single-site
benign hysterectomy (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013).In the U.S. approximately
830,000 cholecystectomies were performed annually, with 90 percent of those completed
laparoscopically (Afdhal and Vollmer, 2014). While the CDC reports approximately 600,000
hysterectomies performed each year (Center of Disease and Control, 2014), 41% of
hysterectomies were being performed through MIS in 2005 (Intuitive Surgical, Q2 Investor
Presentation, 2014). Intuitive Surgical acknowledges this shift in substitute positioning, claiming,
“Our less complex segment has increased from approximately 40% to 60% of U.S. procedures
between 2011 and 2013” (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013:18). This trend has been
further promoted in corporate presentations regarding serving two segments beginning in 2014
(Intuitive Surgical, Q1 Investor Presentation, 2014). The clinical benefits of converting open
cases to MIS, despite cost increase, are frequently accepted. The clinical benefits of converting
complex laparoscopic cases to robotic, despite cost increase are often tolerated. However, the
third period trend of converting MIS to robotic cases was met with severe resistance, beginning
with the price-performance trade-off.
To review, price-performance trade-off is related to the relative value provide by an
alternative. In this case, it is represented by the relative value of laparoscopy for a non-complex
procedure in comparison to robotic surgery. Many industry manufacturers, surgeons, and pundits
weighed in on the debate. One of the primary manufacturers of laparoscopic surgery instruments,
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Ethicon Endo-Surgery, funded a study producing an article titled, “Comparing Robot-Assisted
with Conventional Laparoscopic Hysterectomy: Impact on Cost and Clinical Outcomes” (Pasic
et al., 2010:1). Authored by leading laparoscopic surgeons, the study concluded, “Our findings
reveal little clinical differences in perioperative and postoperative events. This, coupled with the
increased per-case cost of the robot, suggests that further investigation is warranted when
considering this technology for routine laparoscopic hysterectomies” (Pasic et al., 2010:8). Other
surgeons, not sponsored by equipment manufacturers, also voiced their opinion regarding the
relative value of robotics in comparison to laparoscopy. Consider the following statement by the
President of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists: “Robotic surgery is not
the only or the best minimally invasive approach for hysterectomy. Nor is it the most costefficient” (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2013:1). Another leading
gynecological physician group, the American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists
(AAGL), added “Robotic-assisted laparoscopic surgery should not replace conventional
laparoscopic or vaginal procedures for women who could otherwise undergo conventional
laparoscopic or vaginal surgery for benign gynecologic diseases” (Worldwide, AAGL
Advancing Minimally Invasive Gynecology 2013:8). With regards to mainstream media outlets,
the Wall Street Journal published six articles during the period covering robotic surgery with the
following titles:
•
•
•
•
•

“Study Cautions on Robotic Surgery” (Beck, February 2013)
“Robot’s Safety Under Review” (Burton, November 2013)
“The Pros and Cons of Robotic Surgery” (Pinkerton, November 2013)
“Robotic Surgery? Benefit Unclear” (Walker, July 2014)
“Robot Surgery Has Flaws, Study Says” (Beck, October 2014).

• “Robotic Surgery Brings Higher Costs, More Complications, Study Shows” (Beck, 2014)
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The competitive position from substitution stakeholders can be best summarized by the
statement, “Patients should be advised that robotic hysterectomy is best used for unusual and
complex clinical conditions in which improved outcomes over standard minimally invasive
approaches have been demonstrated” (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
2013:2).
The cost of hospitals switching to robotic surgery is equally relevant. Unfortunately,
comparing the cost of robotic surgery to substitute surgical techniques is a convoluted endeavor.
The industry lacks standardization in clinical cost comparison. Consider this examination of over
20 cost comparisons (See Table 37: Robotic Procedural Cost Comparison), varying by
procedure, physician experience, patient comorbidities, patient body habitus, comparing
operating room costs, purely instrument costs, total cost of hospital stay, inclusion of fixed costs
(such as acquisition cost), etc.
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Table 37 Robotic Procedural Cost Comparison
ROBOTIC
COST

SUBSTITUTE
COST

PROCEDURE

SOURCES

OPEN TO ROBOTICS
$14,538

$13,894

MVR

Kam, J. K., Cooray, S. D., Kam, J. K., Smith, J. A. and
Almeida, A. A. (2010).

$32,144

$31,838

MVR

Suri, R. M., Thompson, J. E., Burkhart, H. M.,
Huebner, M., Borah, B. J., Li, Z. and Schaff, H. V.
(2013).

AU$18,503

AU$17,879

MVR

Seco, M., Cao, C., Modi, P., Bannon, P. G., Wilson, M.
K., Vallely, M. P. and Yan, T. D. (2013).

$10,178

$11,370

Sacrocolpopexy

Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive
Gynecology 2013

$6752

$4437

Prostatectomy

Bolenz, C., Gupta, A., Hotze, T., Ho, R., Cadeddu, J.
A., Roehrborn, C. G., & Lotan, Y. (2010).

$17,582

$13,605

Prostatectomy

Hall, R. M., Linklater, N., and Coughlin, G. (2013).

$10,804

$9,693

Prostatectomy

Yu, H. Y., Hevelone, N. D., Lipsitz, S. R., Kowalczyk,
K. J. and Hu, J. C. (2012).

COMPLEX LAPAROSCOPIC TO ROBOTICS
$13,894

$11,153

Nephrectomy

Yu, H. Y., Hevelone, N. D., Lipsitz, S. R., Kowalczyk,
K. J. and Hu, J. C. (2012).

$56,000

$34,500

Myomectomy

Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive
Gynecology 2013

$30,084

$13,400

Myomectomy

Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive
Gynecology 2013

$2724

$2,295

Sacrocolpopexy

Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive
Gynecology 2013

$8,508

$7353

Sacrocolpopexy

Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive
Gynecology 2013

NON-COMPLEX LAPAROSCOPIC TO ROBOTIC
$5410

$2861

Hysterectomy

Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive
Gynecology 2013

$2000 >

Hysterectomy

Weissman, J. S., & Zinner, M. (2013).

$3,500>

Hysterectomy

Shukla, P. J., Scherr, D. S., & Milsom, J. W. (2010).

4,066(pounds)

2,150(pounds)

Hysterectomy

Sarlos, D., Kots, L., Stevanovic, N., & Schaer, G.
(2010).

$7,426

$4,922

Ovary Removal

(Beck, 2014)

$7,444

$4,133

Cyst Removal

(Beck, 2014)

Hysterectomy

Wright, Ananth, Lewin, Burke, Lu, Neugut &
Hershman, (2013).

$2,189>
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Interestingly, despite the comparative landscape there were some overarching themes. Generally,
robotic surgery procedures cost more than their substitute surgical technique. This statement was
less likely in cases where the procedure was a conversion from an open technique to a robotic
technique. With the exception of myomectomy, the cost difference between the conversions from
complex laparoscopy to robotic was less costly than the conversion from non-complex
laparoscopy to robotic. Although this case comparison is limited, it demonstrates that there are
many variables to be considered when evaluating switching costs. However, regarding
substitutes, the relative value of robotic surgery appears to have decreased as the surgical focus
has shifted from open or complex laparoscopic surgery to converting non-complex laparoscopic
surgery to robotics. By the end of this period, substitutes present a moderate threat to robotic
surgery (See Table 38: Pressure from Substitutes Assessment).
Table 38 Pressure from Substitutes Assessment
PRESSURE FROM
SUBSTITUTES
CRITERIA
Price-performance
Trade-off

PERIOD I

Open to MIS
comparison

PERIOD II
Primarily, open to MIS
comparison
Limited robotic to MIS
comparison

PERIOD III

Primarily, robotic to MIS
comparison

Buyer’s Cost of
Switching to
Substitute

Switching to
robotic surgery is
expensive

Switching to substitute after
robotic purchase is
prohibitive

Switching to robotic
surgery is expensive, but
switching to substitute
after robotic purchase is
prohibitive

OVERALL
ASSESSMENT

LOW/MODERATE

MODERATE

MODERATE/HIGH

III.3.2.4 Buyer Bargaining Power.
The ability of buyers to negotiate favorable terms decreased during this period. The
hospital industry was still largely fragmented, although “hospital mergers and acquisitions
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increased 10 percent in the first quarter of 2014 compared with the same time frame last year”
(Daly, 2014:1). Like the previous period, there was only one robotic surgery unit on the market.
Hospitals remained the exclusive purchaser, which, along with the trend in consolidation,
benefited hospitals and surgeons. However, backwards integration remained highly unlikely.
The switching cost for buyers remained non-existent given the monopolistic robotic
manufacturer environment. Buyer margins became increasingly tight given contractions in
reimbursement and robotic cost averaging $1980 per procedure, while fluctuating as high as
$3200 per procedure (Intuitive Surgical, Investor Presentation, Q3 2014). The service line
increased in importance as robotic surgery became a critical component of urology and
gynecology surgical offerings. Lastly, hospital access to information to improve ability to
negotiate terms remained largely unchanged during the period. As a monopoly, the industry
manufacturer could largely influence when and how industry information was disclosed. Overall,
buyer bargaining power was very low for hospitals throughout the period (See Table 39: Buyer
Bargaining Power Assessment).
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Table 39 Buyer Bargaining Power Assessment
BUYER BARGAINING
POWER CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Disproportionate impact on
revenue

Fragmented

Fragmented

Zeus or da Vinci

Single Manufacturer

Single Manufacturer

Hospitals exclusive
purchaser

Hospitals exclusive
purchaser

Hospitals exclusive
purchaser

Backward Integration

University study programs

Less Likely

Less Likely

Switching Costs

Few; inception of robotics

High

High

Buyer Margins

Low Margins

Low Margins

Low Margins

Not important service line

Important

Important

Customers As Informed
(Technologist)

Customers Less Informed

Customers Less
Informed

HIGH BUYER POWER

LOW BUYER POWER

LOW BUYER POWER

Buyer Concentration
Service Differentiation
Industry Purchases

Service Importance
Full Information
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.3.2.5 Supplier Bargaining Power.
As in previous periods, there was limited information disclosed regarding supplier
agreements. There was no evidence to suggest that supplier concentration changed during the
period. It also appeared that supplier dependency remained unchanged. In 2009 it was reported,
“Some of the components necessary for the assembly of ISRG’s products are currently provided
by sole sourced suppliers or single-sourced suppliers” (Scilley and Sissleman, 2009:7). The
narratives regarding suppliers switching cost, differentiation, and substitutes remained largely the
same during the period as well. “While ISRG believes that alternative suppliers exist and could
be identified for sole-sourced components, the cost of the disruption or termination of the supply
of components could cause a significant increase in the costs of these components, which could
negatively affect operating results” (Scilley and Sissleman, 2009). One might estimate the da
Vinci® Surgical System to have thousands of components and possibly hundreds of suppliers.
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Consider the impact of supplier power on one key supplier, Mimic Technology, co-developer
and supplier of the simulation software used in the da Vinci Skills Simulator (Intuitive Surgical,
Website 2014). Currently, there are only a few simulator companies that focus primarily on
robotic surgery simulation, like Mimic Technologies and Simulated Surgical Systems. Although
the area is concentrated, Intuitive Surgical is currently working with Mimic Technologies but
could choose to work with Simulated Surgical Systems or a software developer to create a
platform specific to the da Vinci Skills Simulator. The simulator suppliers are more dependent
on the leading manufacturer of robotic surgery systems than vice versa. There are switching
costs and differences between the simulator systems; but the costs are not exorbitant, and the
differences are not extreme. The likelihood of this supplier or others forward integrating into the
production of robotic surgery systems is unlikely. In fact, it is more likely that a key supplier
may be acquired; consider Luna Innovations (Intuitive Surgical, Q1 Quarterly Report, 2014).
Overall, supplier bargaining power during the period remained low/moderate (See Table 40:
Supplier Bargaining Power Assessment).
Table 40 Supplier Bargaining Power Assessment
SUPPLIER BARGAINING
POWER CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Very Concentrated

Less Concentrated

Less Concentrated

Dependency

High

Moderate

Low

Switching Costs

High

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Few

Few

Few

Possible

Unlikely

Unlikely

HIGH SUPPLIER
POWER

LOW/MODERATE
SUPPLIER POWER

LOW/MODERATE
SUPPLIER POWER

Concentration

Differentiation
Substitutes
Forward Integration
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
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III.3.2.6 Overall Industry Structure (5-Forces).
In comparison to the previous period, the industry structure remained largely unchanged.
The robotic manufacturer faced a limited threat of new entrants due to high industry barriers to
entry. Downward pricing pressures were absent from industry rivals given the monopolistic
characteristics of the industry. The bargaining power for hospitals remained anemic, and supplier
power remained low to moderate at best. However, the threat of substitution changed given the
focus of surgeons, hospitals, and non-robotic manufacturers regarding alternatives to robotic
surgery. The threat of substitutes therefore increased in this period from moderate to
moderate/high. Overall, the robotic surgery manufacturer’s market power for this period was
very strong. See Table 41: 5-Forces Overall Assessment.
Table 41 5-Forces Overall Assessment
PORTER 5-FORCES

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Low Barriers to Entry

High Barriers to Entry

High Barriers to Entry

Highly Competitive

Not Competitive

Not Competitive

Pressure from Substitutes

Low/Moderate

Moderate

Moderate/High

Buyer Bargaining Power

High

Low

Low

Supplier Bargaining Power

High

Low/Moderate

Low/Moderate

WEAK INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE

VERY STRONG INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE

VERY STRONG
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

Threat of New Entrants
Intensity of Rivalry

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.3.2.7 Predicted Role of Industry Structure on Customer Value.
The maintenance of a very strong industry structure from period II to Period III for
robotic surgery manufacturers during this period should result in hospitals experiencing declines
of value within their robotic surgery programs. As shown below, the diminished value is realized
and consistent with expected behavior from Porter’s 5-Forces model.
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III.3.3 Customer Value
III.3.3.1 Clinical Value.
By this period, the core benefits of robotic surgery were fairly well accepted. In a
September 2011 article titled “Status Of Robotic Assistance—A Less Traumatic And More
Accurate Minimally Invasive Surgery,” the authors found “The most promising procedures are
those in which the robot enables a laparoscopic approach where open surgery is usually
required” (Kenngott, Fischer, Nickel, Rom, Rassweiler and Müller-Stich, 2012:1). Still, the
acceptance of the core benefits of robotic surgery, in converting open procedures to MIS, was
not without dissent. The American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL)
expressed “the lack of direct access to the patient to be a signiﬁcant disadvantage compared with
conventional laparoscopy” (Worldwide, AAGL Advancing Minimally Invasive Gynecology
2013:3). As discussed earlier, the Wall Street Journal published several articles during the period
questioning the benefits of robotic surgery, even in comparison to traditional open procedures
(Walker, 2014). Nonetheless, with over 7,000 peer review articles and over 1,000 comparative
studies in circulation by the end of the period (Intuitive Surgical, Q111 Investor Presentation,
2014), the da Vinci system was found to have moderate and high levels of evidentiary support
for its core clinical value proposition (O'Toole, Bouazza-Marouf, Kerr, Gooroochurn, &
Vloeberghs, 2010). High is defined as “Randomized controlled clinical trial or systematic
review” and moderate is defined as “upgraded observational study or downgraded randomized
trial or systematic review” (O'Toole, Bouazza-Marouf, Kerr, Gooroochurn, & Vloeberghs,
2010:301). Although the core benefits were still strong, especially for converting open
procedures to MIS, the evidence of value relative to converting non-complex laparoscopic
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procedures to robotic was less compelling. Overall, the clinical core benefits this period slipped
slightly to moderately high.
Equally significant were the unique benefits of robotic surgery. These add-on benefits
became more important this period as comparisons between robotic surgery and laparoscopy
became more prevalent. This is especially evident when exploring complex MIS. For instance, in
the beginning of the period a subsequent study by Payne and others found “Women with large
uteri may successfully undergo robotically assisted hysterectomy with low morbidity, low blood
loss, and minimal risk of conversion to laparotomy” (Payne, Dauterive, Pitter, Giep H., Giep B.,
Grogg & Hubert 2010).
The interest in the da Vinci Single-Site™ is another example of add-on benefits. In May 2008,
Covidien introduced the Covidien SILS(TM) Procedure Kit to be used in Single-Incision
Laparoscopic Surgery and other laparoscopic procedures (Covidien, News Release, 2008). In
2011, the da Vinci Single-Site™ was introduced to enable surgeons to remove the gallbladder or
uterus through a small navel incision, often times providing the patient with improved cosmesis
(Intuitive Surgical, Single-Site Website, 2014). The focus of this device is converting noncomplex procedures performed laparoscopically into robotically assisted procedures. In the
summer of 2012 a comparative study between the single-site robotic approach and the singleincision laparoscopic approach for cholecystectomy was released. The study found that the
robotic approach was safe, easy to learn, and faster than its laparoscopic counterpart (Spinoglio,
Lenti, Maglione, Lucido, Priora, Bianchi & Quarati, 2012). By the end of 2013, over 800
customers had ordered Single-Site™ (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013) to pursue the
single-site robotic approach. In this period, the patient value equation (Patient Value = Efficacy /
Invasiveness) extended beyond the traditional consideration of open and complex MIS

119

procedures to the consideration of exchanging laparoscopic for robotic approaches. Consider the
following descriptive statement added to the annual report to describe patient value: “When the
patient value of a da Vinci procedure is deemed higher than alternate treatment options, patients
may seek out hospitals that offer that specific da Vinci procedure…” (Intuitive Surgical, Annual
Report, 2012:23). The word ‘deemed’ highlights the importance of perceived value, which is at
the heart of the contention between the reality of robotics and the positions of alternative
minimally invasive advocates. Deemed does not equal clinically proven. Nonetheless, this period
saw the introduction of products and instrumentation to create differentiators between robotic
approaches and the laparoscopic contemporaries. These products demonstrated benefits that were
unique to the robotic approach, which proved once again to deliver high levels of add-on
benefits.
Regarding, long-term relational benefits evident through patient satisfaction, the period
was mixed. A study by Dr. Samadi, who has conducted over 5,500 robotic prostatectomies,
concluded that 1-year post treatment nearly 90% of his patients are satisfied with their prostate
cancer decision (Collingwood, McBride, Leapman, Hobbs, Kwon, Stensland & Samadi, 2014).
An alternative study conducted by Dr. Pitter found “that patient experience was better for each of
the major minimally invasive approaches than for abdominal hysterectomy. However, roboticassisted hysterectomy was the only modality that independently predicted greater satisfaction
and willingness to recommend and have the same procedure again” (Pitter, Simmonds, SeshadriKreaden & Hubert, 2014:1). Conversely, a March 2013 report on robotic surgery discussed the
following:
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“However, a CNBC Investigations Inc. review, which included numerous interviews with
surgeons, lawyers, ex-employees and patients, and an extensive review of internal
documents, multiple studies, lawsuits and depositions of current employees, shows:
• A sharp rise in lawsuits and complaints about injuries, complications and even deaths
following da Vinci procedures. At least 10 have been filed over the past two years, most
of them in 2012; many more complaints, plaintiffs’ attorneys says, are headed toward
mediation.
• Surgeons can use the robot to operate on patients after several steps, including at least an
hour of online training, four hours watching two full-length procedures online, seven
hours operating on a pig and as few as two surgeries, overseen by a more seasoned
robotic surgeon. The number of supervised cases can vary by hospital.
• A high-pressure sales culture driven by quarterly "quotas" on surgical procedures has led
sales people to lean on surgeons to do more robotic surgeries, according to interviews
with former salespeople and internal emails” (Greenberg, 2013:2)
The robotic manufacturer faced a litany of lawsuits during the period, one alleging vaginal cuff
dehiscence, an opening of the vagina allowing the intestines to fall out (McDonald v. Intuitive
Surgical, Inc., 2014). Another lawsuit, Tiblier v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc. (2014), alleges that the
plaintiff suffered a bladder tear due to micro-cracks in the monopolar scissors, which were
subsequently recalled (FDA, website, 2014). During the period, Intuitive Surgical or corporate
representatives were named defendants in over 60 legal proceedings (Intuitive Surgical Federal
Litigation Fillings, 2014). Given the mix of patient satisfaction, legal claims, and recalls, the
overall long-term relational clinical benefits were assessed as moderate for the period.
As discussed previously, there were over 7,000 peer reviewed published clinical trials,
523,000 procedures, and 3,100 installed robots by the end of 2014 (Intuitive Surgical, Q3
Investor Presentation, 2014). Robotic surgery became well established in gynecology and
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urology while growing in other surgical specialties, but utilization rates flattened around 180
cases per robot per year, with year over year improvement utilization flattening between 2012
and 2014. See Figure 9: Mean Utilization Rates. This utilization rate equals about 3.5 cases per
robot per week. In multiple publications surgeons discussed performing 1-2 cases per day or 510 cases per week (Franasiak, Craven, Mosaly & Gehrig, 2014). Despite the increase in market
adoption, operational benefits appeared to stall. Consequently, transactional benefits remained
moderate. Overall, there were slight reductions in clinical value in core and relational benefits,
resulting in a moderate assessment for the period (See Table 42: Clinical Value Assessment).
Table 42 Clinical Value Assessment
CLINICAL CRITERIA

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Core Benefit

Moderately High

High

Moderate/High

Add-on Benefit

Moderately High

High

High

Moderate

High

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Moderate

MODERATE

HIGH

MODERATE

Relational Benefit
Transactional Benefit
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

III.3.3.2 Financial Value.
During the period, there were multiple studies that reflected procedural cost parity or
advantages between robotic surgery and traditional open surgery, demonstrating core financial
benefits (See Table 43). The core benefits of robotic surgery are best reflected in benefits or
perceived benefits in converting open procedures to MIS. These cases saw core financial
advantages related to mitral valve repairs (Kam, 2010; Suri et al., 2013; Seco et al., 2013),
prostatectomy (Bolenz et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013), and sacrocolopexy
(Worldwide, AAGL, 2013). The mounting evidence in support of cost equivalency or slight cost
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increases for converting open cases to robotic cases during the period supported an assessment of
moderate core financial benefit.
Unlike core benefits, the add-on financial benefit for robotic cases decreased this period
as the proportion of non-complex to complex robotic procedures performed increased. In
October 2014, a group of “researchers from Columbia University found that the technology costs
significantly more and has a higher rate of complications than regular minimally invasive
surgery for removing ovaries and ovarian cysts” (Beck, 2014:1). Central to add-on benefits is the
ability to create ‘unique value’; pundits for laparoscopy claim that the advent of robotic surgery
for non-complex procedures adds cost but does not add unique financial value, evidenced by
increasing revenue. Much of the financial strain of robotic surgery is related to the following
corporate statement: “Our less complex segment has increased from approximately 40% of U.S.
procedures in 2011 to approximately 60% of U.S. procedures in 2013” (Intuitive Surgical, Q114
Quarterly Reports, 2014:36). Between 2011 and 2013, approximately 648,000 procedures,
consisting primarily of benign gynecology and cholecystectomies, were performed. Cases like
single-site cholecystectomies do offer unique value, but with diminishing reimbursements,
elevated costs (adding $500 - $2500 per case), and mitigated clinical benefits in comparison to
their laparoscopic alternatives (Barbash, & Glied, 2010). Overall, the financial add-on benefit
slipped to moderate, as procedural trends switched from complex to non-complex.
This shift in robotic procedural mix impacted the financial relational benefits and longterm profitability for RSPs. On the revenue side, complex procedures like oncology and
cardiovascular procedures, which have higher reimbursements, have given way to less complex
procedures, which reimburse less, leading to less revenue per robotic case performed.
Alternatively, robotic costs have continued to rise. The average service cost per system increased
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from $139,000 per year (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2009) to $145,000 per year (Intuitive
Surgical, Annual Report, 2014). Lastly, the average cost of instruments per case increased from
$1,888 per case (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2009) to $1,980 per case (Intuitive Surgical,
Annual Report, 2014). Overall, the recurring cost per robotic system increased from
approximately $402,000 in 2009 to $482,000 in 2013. These costs, in conjunction with
diminishing reimbursements, decreased the long-term relational benefit of RSPs from high, in
the previous period, to moderate.
The short-term, transactional benefits relative to acquisition costs increased during the
period as well. The average sale price increased from $1.39 million, at the beginning of the
period, to $1.52 million, in 2013 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2009 and 2013). Several
proponents quoted significantly higher pricing; the Wall Street Journal published a range of
“$1.5 million-to-$2.2 million” (Beck, 2013:1). The Journal of Minimally Invasive Surgery
reported a range “between $1.6 million and $2.5 million for each unit” (Worldwide, 2013:7) and
Trustee reported $1.7 to 2.2 million (Montagnolo, 2011). In either case, the acquisition costs
have increased over time, resulting in the lowest transactional benefits to date. Overall, the
financial value during this period slipped from moderate/high in the previous period to moderate
(See Table 43: Financial Value Assessment).
Table 43 Financial Value Assessments
FINANCIAL CRITERIA
Core Benefit
Add-on Benefit
Relational Benefit
Transactional Benefit
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Low/Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

High

Moderate

Low

High

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate/Low

Low

LOW/MODERATE

MODERATE/HIGH

MODERATE
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III.3.3.3 Strategic Value.
The core strategic benefit for a RSP is the ability to recruit patients and physicians to the
hospital. Evidence suggests that this benefit waned towards the end of the period. In 2013, for
the first time, year-over-year procedural growth did not exceed the procedural volume growth of
the previous year (See Figure 12: Year Over Year Procedural Growth), which resulted in lower
than projected instrument and system sales.
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Figure 12 Year over Year Procedural Growth
Poor Q2 results precipitated the poor procedural performance, which was explained by the
manufacturer as follows:
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“There appear to be a couple of underlying causes for slower than expected U.S. benign
dVH growth… Overall admissions for benign gynecology appear to be under pressure in
the first half of 2013. Since we are a significant share of hysterectomy our growth rate in
dVH is sensitive to these admissions. Second, our MCS notification and negative press
occurred in the quarter, it may have pressured growth in utilization, although estimating
their impact on procedure volume is difficult. Given that the average da Vinci system is
used for hundreds of procedures per year, a change in da Vinci patient admissions can
free capacity on existing systems and pressure new system sales. This appears to be the
case this quarter” (Seeking Alpha, Q213 ISRG Earnings Call, 2013:2).

The ability of robotic surgery to recruit new patients was somewhat in question given the poor
procedural numbers in 2013. Following the first quarter of 2014, the manufacturer announced,
“Gynecology procedures fell slightly year-over-year, driven by a contraction of procedures in the
United States” (Seeking Alpha, Q114 ISRG Earnings Call, 2014:2). Physician demand was still
strong for da Vinci; however, the shift in the substitution landscape impacted the strategic value
of the system. Patients clamored less for robotic options in treating conditions where minimally
invasive alternatives were available. As a result, core strategic benefits decreased to moderate for
this period.
The strategic add-on benefits continued to increase during the period. This was largely
due to emphasis on the role of an ‘experienced robotic surgeon.’ A 2010 New England Journal of
Medicine article suggested, “Surgeons must perform 150 to 250 procedures to become adept in
their use” (Barbash and Glied, 2010:1). Regarding robotic assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy,
one author suggested, “the learning curve started to plateau after 1000-1500 cases”
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(Sooriakumaran, John, Wiklund, Lee, Nilsson & Tewari, 2011:1). The Wall Street Journal
reported, “Some surgeons with extensive robotic experience say it takes at least 200 surgeries to
become proficient at the da Vinci and reduce the risks of surgical complications. That's difficult
for surgeons at smaller hospitals to achieve” (Carreyrou, 2010:5). This focus on experienced
surgeons allowed for the fortification of new market positions based upon robotic surgery
experience. As new procedures such as single-site cholecystectomy and hysterectomy were
approved, hospitals continued to invest deeply in robotics to pursue these positions of market
leadership. Consequently, the add-on strategic benefits remained high during this period.
Surgeon satisfaction during this period remained strong from 2010 - 2013, as evidenced
by the amount of surgeons performing robotic procedures and implementing new robotic surgery
programs. The vast majority of opposition toward robotic surgery cites the expense
(McLaughlin, J., 2013). This is important to note, given that the technical value proposition of
robotic surgery references enhanced vision, control, and instrument dexterity (Intuitive Surgical,
2002 and Computer Motion, 2002). There is little to no opposition regarding these tenets of
robotic surgery; more often than not, critiques reference expense and/or surgeon training (Rabin,
2013). However, one trend that could be indicative of waning physician satisfaction is decreasing
procedure growth year over year (See Figure 12: Year Over Year Procedural Growth). In early
2014, robotic hysterectomy volume, the highest volume robotic procedure, reduced dramatically
(Seeking Alpha, Q114 ISRG Earning Call, 2014). Overall, surgeons appear to still be optimistic
and satisfied by the benefits afforded by a robotic surgery program, leading to continued high but
declining relational benefit assessment.
Regarding the transactional benefits of robotic surgery, there were two key publications
that came out during the period worth exploring. Both studies examined the marketing value of
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robotic surgery, which aligns with transactional benefits in the sense that one can market the
purchase of the technology immediately. In 2011, the authors examined the websites of 400 U.S.
hospitals touting robotic surgery programs. They found 37% presented robotic surgery on their
homepage, 73% used stock images, and 86% made statements of clinical superiority regarding
robotic surgery (Jin, Ibrahim, Newman, Makarov, Pronovost, & Makary, 2011). The inclusion of
robotic surgery in such a prominent way illustrates the strategic transactional benefit of robotic
surgery. The second study, conducted in 2014, researched “The Impact of Marketing Language
on Patient Preference for Robot-Assisted Surgery” (Dixon, Grant, & Urbach, 2015). The study
found that the marketing frame of robotic surgery versus alternative techniques, like laparoscopy,
was likely to induce patients to select robotic surgery independent of evidence based-outcomes
(Dixon, Grant, & Urbach, 2015). Both studies are suggestive of the high strategic transactional
benefits of robotic surgery (See Table 44: Strategic Value Assessment).
Table 44 Strategic Value Assessment
STRATEGIC CRITERIA
Core Benefit
Add-on Benefit
Relational Benefit
Transactional Benefit
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Low

High

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

High

Low

High

High

Moderate

High

High

LOW/MODERATE

HIGH

HIGH

III.3.3.4 Overall Customer Value.
This period saw the expansion of robotic surgery to robotic hysterectomy. During the
period, robotic hysterectomy eclipsed robotic prostatectomy to become the highest volume
robotic procedure and expanded the robotic installation base by almost 1800 units. The success
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of robotic surgery during this period was largely driven by a return to a 2001 commitment to
“Simply Existing, High-Volume MIS Procedures” (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2001:6).
Although this commitment did not resurface in plain text on annual reports during the period, the
inclusion of hysterectomy and single site procedures serve as concrete examples of the thematic
trend, which dominated the period. This focus on non-complex procedures supported the
beneficial elements discussed above, but it also facilitated negative press, competitive reactions
from surgical substitution providers and manufacturers, as well as an increase in litigation. The
empowering of substitutions diminished the relative value of robotic surgery during the period.
As an example, one author described the use of the robotic system to remove a gallbladder as, “A
bit like killing a fly with nuclear weapons” (Levy, 2014:1). During the period, the reduction in
clinical and financial value was driven by the increased application of robotics for less complex
surgical procedures. Although this trend increased procedural volume and system sales, it
reduced the overall customer value of robotic surgery program from moderately high to simply
moderate (See Table 45: Customer Value Overall Assessment).
Table 45 Costumer Value Overall-Assessment
ROBOTIC SURGERY
CUSTOMER VALUE

PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Clinical Value

Moderate

High

Moderate

Financial Value

Low/Moderate

Moderate/High

Low/Moderate

Strategic Value

Low/Moderate

High

High

LOW/MODERATE

MODERATE/HIGH

MODERATE

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Hospital Value Predicted vs. Hospital Value Assessed.
From 2010-2014, the robotic surgery industry remained strong. As predicted, the RSP
value decreased from Period II to Period III. This diminished value can be attributed to the
robotic surgery manufacturer’s strategic moves consistent with conventional wisdom relative to
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an industry leader operating with strong market power. During this period, the manufacturers
increased focused on larger procedural markets in order to drive capital and recurring instrument
revenue. These procedural markets were largely characterized by less complex procedures,
which resulted in relatively lower clinical value in comparison to surgical alternatives to
robotics. Financially, this shift in manufacturer direction resulted in lower financial value for
hospitals as less complex procedures were typically characterized by lower reimbursement rates.
This period, similar to the second period, was characterized by strong industry structure.
Interestingly, hospital strategic value remained largely intact during the period. (See Table 46
Period III: Integrated Industry Structure and Customer Value).
Table 46 Industry Structure and Customer Value
2010 - 2014

Overall Industry Structure
Assessment
(Very Strong)

ROBOTIC SURGERY CUSTOMER VALUE
(HOSPITAL VIEWPOINT)

Clinical

Financial

Strategic

C – Present
A – Present
R – Present
T – Slightly Present

C – Not Present
A – Slightly Present
R – Barely Present
T – Barely Present

C – Slightly Present
A – Slightly Present
R – Slightly Present
T – Slightly Present
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IV IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ON CUSTOMER VALUE
IV.1 Discussion
The purpose of this research was to explore how hospitals can apply an integrated
understanding of industry structure and customer value to improve a RSP. This qualitative
longitudinal industry study was conducted by examining over 200 public sources, including
corporate reports, company and industry websites, published clinical studies, analyst evaluations,
hospital press releases, mainstream media reports, university studies, and government reports
regarding robotic surgery during the period of 1999 through 2014. This exploration was
conducted using 5-forces to evaluate industry structure, predicting the role of the industry
structure on customer value, using the CFS-CART framework to appraise RSP value, followed
by an exploration into the interactions between the industry analysis and customer value specific
to the hospital. The research produced four critical findings.
IV.1.1 5-Forces Findings.
The first finding is that in the face of increasing industry structure, identification of
favorable forces may create opportunities to preserve and/or increase overall customer value.
Porter suggested that the 5-forces model reveals implications regarding industry and firm (Porter,
2008). Regarding the robotic surgery manufacturing industry, I found that the increase in
industry structure from Period I to Period II was associated with gross profits of $88 million in
2004 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2004), $751 million in 2009 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual
Report, 2009), and $1.5 billion in 2013 (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013). Porter also
proposed that 5-forces “guide managers toward fruitful possibilities for strategic action,” which
includes efforts to alter industry structure in a way that favors a firm (Porter, 2008:27). This was
evident in Intuitive Surgical’s decision to merge toward the end of Period I, which benefited the
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manufacturer by reducing industry rivalry and mitigating buyer bargaining power. This effect
was further evidenced by the rapid extension of the da Vinci robotic surgery installation base
across the second period, from 286 in 2004 to 2,966 in 2013, as well as increased annual R&D
spending from $17 million in 2004 to $167 million in 2013, which erected substantial barriers of
entry. Over the course of the examined period the industry structure for robotic manufacturers
strengthened most dramatically between periods I and II, with a slight decrease in robotic
manufacturer market power in period III.
Through this exploration I discovered pressure from substitutes, unlike the broader
market forces, increased across all three periods. Consequently, since pressure from substitutes
has an inverse relationship with regard to industry structure, pressure from substitutes was the
only market force that negatively impacted robotic manufacturer market power (See Figure 13:
Industry Structure by Force).
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The identification of this inverse relationship and increasing market power is essential for
hospitals to increase customer value within their RSPs. As defined earlier, substitutions are
represented by alternative MIS techniques which offer similar benefits to robotic surgery (i.e.
laparoscopy). Throughout the three periods, as procedural applications of robotic usage have
become less complex (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013:18), the relative values of robotic
surgery in comparison to alternative techniques has decreased.
IV.1.1.1 Customer Value Findings.
The second critical finding is that exploring customer value related to RSPs, both through
the lens of CART benefits and in the sub-context of CFS values (CFS-CART Framework), aids
in the identification of market power influences on customer value. Although the research
literature regarding customer value is extensive, research specific to customer value related to
capital-intensive medical innovations is sparse. The work of Menon, Homburg and Beutin,
combined with the insights of Grönroos, provides the basis of a framework that considers direct
benefits in conjunction with indirect benefits. Additional works (Barney, 1991; Magretta, 2013;
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand B., and Lampel J., 2005; Porter, 1998; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; and
Vandenbosch, 2002) further suggest the importance of the inclusion of ‘unique value’ in any
evaluation of customer value. Beginning in 2000, in an examination of the literature on robotic
surgery, language associated with ‘clinical’ benefits and ‘cost’ concerns were limited to clinical
and financial value. My findings indicate a third value proposition, strategic value, which is
drawn from Mintzberg (2005). The inclusion of these constructs enabled the evaluation of
customer value based on clinical, financial, and strategic value. This method of valuation
enables the formation of collective and individual insights specific to capital-intensive medical
innovations.
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For instance, the overall customer value of RSPs, based on CART benefits, increased from
Period I to II, but subsided from Period II to III (See Figure 14: Customer Value).
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Figure 14 Customer Value
Examining each value separately reveals an elevated assessment of strategic value since
2005. Clinical and financial value both abated, with financial value being the more depressed of
the two. These insights are helpful in understanding the further promulgation of robotic surgery,
while robotic opponents bemoaned the lack of value of robotic surgery in Period II and III based
upon the lack of clinical evidence and higher cost of service delivery (Levy, 2007; Pasic et al.,
2010; Beck, 2013; Weissman and Zinner, 2013). Regarding value in health care Michael Porter
shared, “Value in health care is the health outcome per dollar of cost expended” (Porter, 2006).
Figure 14 demonstrates that Porter’s limited focus on two value components of capital-intensive
medical innovations, while neglecting the strategic value which proved to be the most dominant

134

over the past two periods. In a healthcare environment characterized by physician shortages,
consolidations, and increased competitiveness, strategic value has become pre-eminent. An
assessment of value simply based on clinical and financial attributes, while consistent with calls
for comparative effectiveness and value-based medicine, fails to consider the strategic nature of
capital-intensive medical innovation investments. As the procedural complexity of robotic
surgery programs has decreased, the relative clinical value has diminished, and the relative
financial value has dropped sharply.
Examining a matrix view of CFS value uncovers the influence of direct benefits in
contrast to indirect benefits on CFS value (See Figure 15: CFS Value Matrix). Consider the
implications of the void illustrated below where high levels of indirect benefits are not
experienced absent high levels of direct benefits.
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Figure 15 CFS Value Matrix
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In the first period, short-term clinical value was unclear and long-term financial and
strategic was speculative. Comparatively, Period I strategic value remains in the upper right,
while clinical value has fallen off slightly relative to diminishing procedural complexity.
Financial value was at its highest when robotic procedural applications were more consistent
with converting cases to MIS (Core Clinical Benefits) (Seeking Alpha, Quarter 3, 2008), while
surgeons were discovering unique value of robotic surgery in comparison to laparoscopy (Addon Clinical Benefits) (Payne and Dauterive, 2008). This change in surgical trends contributed to
perceived long-term financial benefits (Relational Benefits) (Morgan et al., 2005).
IV.1.1.2 Hospital Value Predicted vs. Hospital Value Assessed Findings.
Another critical finding is the limited predictability of industry structure on hospital RSP
value. Many believed that hospitals’ unrealized value in RSP was due to manufacturer market
power, however during the first two periods industry structure predictive nature was limited.
Based on theory relative to competitiveness and profit maximization, first period industry
structure would suggests that hospitals could experience disproportionate gains in value during
the first period and disproportionate losses in value during the second period. (See Table 47: RSP
Value Predicted vs. Value Assessed).
Table 47 Value Predicted vs. Value Assessed
PERIOD I

PERIOD II

PERIOD III

Industry Structure Assessment

Weak

Strong

Strong

RSP Value Predicted

High

Decreased

Decreased

RSP Value Assessed

Low

Increased

Decreased

The difference between prediction and assessment during the first two periods, in comparison to,
the third period could be attributed to characteristic of technology adoption. Proponents of
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technology adoption suggest that innovators and early adopters are characterized as technology
enthusiasts or buyers motivated by “their own intuition and vision” (Moore, 2002:12). Whereas
the early majority market is driven by “a strong sense of practicality” (Moore, 2002:13). During
the first period, hospitals purchasing robotic surgery units were primarily innovators and the
industry was largely unstable. Consequently, the predictive value of industry structure based on
innovators and early adopters would not necessarily be the same for later adopters in Period II.
Comparatively, the third period suggest that the industry was more mature and stable, and
industry structure assessment becomes a better predictor of RSP value.
IV.1.1.3 Integrated Approach Findings
The remaining critical finding is that the degree of market presence of CFS value subconstructs appears to be uniquely influenced by an integrated view of 5-Forces and CART
benefits, leading to clusters of value. Although there is extensive research on industry structure
and customer value, there is little research between the two. However, as illustrated in Table 1,
there have been several research efforts that have explored industry structure within other
frameworks. In one article, Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) suggest a theoretical framework to
explain the network of strategic linkages in light of a global industry structure. The purpose of
my study was to explore and ultimately propose a theoretical construct to understand the
integrated role of industry structure and customer value specific to RSPs in order to enhance
these programs. The CFS Value Matrix, Figure 15, equipped us with an aggregated view of
direct benefits in comparison to indirect benefits. For a view based on individual CART
benefits, the assessments were coalesced into a 2x2 matrix (See Table 48: CART Model).
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Table 48 CART Model
BENEFITS

RELATIONAL

TRANSACTIONAL

Add-On

A-R

A-T

Core

C-R

C-T

The graphic depiction of each quadrant allowed for additional insights. Consider Figure 16:
CART Quadrant Benefits; these models illustrate a clinical and strategic value cluster across all
periods and varying degrees of industry structure. The clusters emphasize the long-term or
relational benefits of RSPs, with clinical relational slightly higher than strategic relational
benefits. The A-R benefits contribute to higher financial value than C-T benefits and represent
the tightest clustering of CFS values in comparison to all other quadrants.
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Figure 16 CART Quadrant Benefits
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Figure 16: CART Quadrant Benefits illustrates longitudinal growth in transactional
clinical benefits from Period I to Period III; this can be understood as staff procedural
competency, training models (computer simulation), and surgeon experience improved over the
research period. This increase in relational clinical benefits occurred despite the increased market
power of robotic manufacturers, which suggests that clinical value may increase in value despite
diminished market power for hospitals. Once again, the add-on benefits model demonstrated a
tighter cluster than its core benefits counterpart. However, the consolidation of benefits is not as
tight as the A-R benefits, which reemphasizes the importance of long-term benefits for RSPs.
The last major finding is the dramatic decrease in transactional financial benefits between Period
I and subsequent periods, which appears to be closely aligned with the change in industry
structure.
IV.2 Contributions
IV.2.1 Contribution to Theory on Porter’s 5-Forces and Customer Value.
These findings yielded several theoretical contributions to industry analysis in the
application of 5-Forces. First, traditionally the 5-Forces model is applied to an industry with the
firm or organization in mind. Porter appropriately encourages the contemplation of 5-forces with
regard to firms evaluating industry structure for market implications to 1) Position the company,
2) Exploit industry change, 3) Shape industry structure, and/or 4) Define the industry (Porter,
2008). However, Porter’s recommendations fall short by not recommending the consideration of
5-forces by industry customers as a means of identifying opportunities to increase customer
value. By doing so, I discovered the ability to further facilitate the use of laparoscopy to exceed
industry utilization rates (Figure 9), reduce program costs, and improve upon robotic surgery
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program profitability. This theoretical extension of 5-Forces spreads beyond RSPs to other
capital-intensive medical innovations, resulting in broader applications.
Second, 5-Forces is generally applied as a solitary framework “relating a company to its
environment” (Porter, 1980:3) or as a tool for evaluating the structural power of an industry
(Powell, 1996). Our findings build on the research of Grundy (2006) by utilizing 5-forces to
conduct a longitudinal study to explore varying levels of industry strength across a research
period and to consider the market implications of such periodic variance. This application
contributed to the identification of pressure from substitutes as a means to improve RSP
profitability and overall value.
A third theoretical contribution to 5-Forces is the integrated use of 5-Forces in
conjunction with a customer value framework to identify market power influences on value.
This is an extension of Grundy’s (2006) suggestion of interrelating 5-forces with other
frameworks to provide operating managers with meaningful insight. In the case of RSPs, the
integrated application of 5-Forces and a customer value framework allows practitioners to isolate
consistent streams of value, like clinical value, through varying industry structures. It also
enables administrators to concentrate cost savings efforts into forces like buyer bargaining
power, related to creation of unique value. For example, a high volume surgeon’s participation
in regulatory approval for a new medical technology may allow for reduced pricing, despite high
manufacturer market power. This integrated application contributes to a limited pool of research
on 5-Forces and customer value and to an even smaller collection of research specific to RSPs.
IV.2.2 Contributions to Theory on Customer Value.
In accordance with comparative effectiveness research, the preponderance of clinical
research on robotic surgery focuses on clinical and financial concerns (Weissman and Zinner,
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2013) without a lens for strategy. The research introduced the CFS-CART framework, which
enables hospital administrators to evaluate clinical and financial concerns within the same
context as strategic considerations. Moreover, this model allows for the evaluation of primary
and secondary effects of capital-intensive medical innovations as well as indirect benefits to
evaluate long and short-term value implications. The framework facilitates the aggregation and
disaggregation of CFS value to explore the longitudinal effects on value. Regarding RSPs, this
information allows hospital executives to recognize industry fluctuations in CFS constructs and
recognize harmful trends in order to take corrective actions. For instance, the investment in a
RSP primarily for financial gain may fall short of expectations. On the other hand, despite
mainstream media divergent accounts, the clinical value of robotic surgery exceeded
expectations over the course of this study. Such a view may reinforce clinical efforts to sustain
robotic surgery as a capital-intensive medical innovation.
In addition, the CFS Value Matrix serves as a complementary framework that illustrates
collective direct benefit in comparison to collective relational and add-on benefits. This tool is
useful for clinical managers seeking to identify value voids and short/long-term program
benefits. In comparison, the CART Model allows hospital administrators to focus their efforts
on the quadrant that is most receptive to value pursuits. For example, administrators interested
in maximizing clinical value may look to emphasize relational benefits as opposed to
transactional ones. In contrast, hospital administrators that are more dependent on quick returns
related to RSPs may be better served by pursuing strategic value over clinical or financial.
Lastly, this research contributes to the existing literature dedicated to customer value in
capital-intensive medical innovations, and more broadly, to literature specific to the healthcare
industry. As previously discussed, there has been little research regarding customer value in
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relation to robotic surgery or capital-intensive medical innovations. Most research that includes
customer value focuses on patients (Seeking Alpha, Q4 ISRG Earning Call, 2008; Collingwood,
McBride, Leapman, Hobbs, Kwon, Stensland and Samadi, 2014; Pitter, Simmonds, SeshadriKreaden and Hubert, 2014). This research diverged from existing norms by researching value
specific to hospitals.
IV.2.3 Contributions to Practice.
This research presents contributions that enable hospitals to better understand RSPs
within the context of industry structure, in order to improve the value of their RSPs. For instance,
the findings suggest hospital leadership would do well to employ laparoscopy in conjunction
with robotic initiatives. Pressure from substitutes was the only diverging market force, as such
laparoscopy allows administrators to safeguard the use of robotics for more complex procedures
with improved clinical, financial, and strategic value. Secondarily, hospitals would improve
value by crafting a deliberate, strategic approach to their program. Throughout the period, RSPs
have demonstrated a consistent ability to attract physicians and patients, create new market
leadership positions, satisfy surgeons, and improve marketing. Moreover, the continued
presence of strategic value, throughout all periods, directly equates to value realization. The
findings suggest that hospitals should independently design an objective, customized strategy to
incorporate this value.
In addition, hospitals should look to incorporate direct benefits above indirect benefits.
Throughout the entire study, moderate to high levels of indirect benefits were not evident
without equivalent levels of direct benefits. Moderate to high levels of direct benefits did occur,
however, absent moderate indirect benefits. Another practical contribution of the research is the
consistency of RSP clinical value, throughout the study, even as the proportion of robotic
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procedures decreased in complexity during Period III (Intuitive Surgical, Annual Report, 2013).
As procedural complexity decreased, so did clinical value; this is not to say, however, that
robotic surgery does not offer value in less complex cases. It simply illustrates that perceived and
experienced clinical value has always been present or slightly present throughout the study, even
with varying industry structures.
The next practical contribution, in contrast, suggests that financial value has been less
present, and has grown more elusive, in RSPs. This does not mean that RSPs are without real or
perceived financial value; rather, it is an indication that this particular value has become less
clear. In practical application, hospitals might include a structure to capture cost to better
illuminate financial trends and incorporate methodologies to assuage costs. Additionally,
transactional clinical benefits have grown period over period. This is the only benefit that has
experienced consistent increase. Hospitals can be encouraged that as program experience grows,
clinical benefits increase in presence. Lastly, hospital executives could extend the application of
these models to improve the synergy between capital purchases and organizational strategic
plans.
IV.3 Conclusion
This research has demonstrated that hospitals can apply an integrated understanding of industry
structure and customer value to improve a RSP by:
•
•
•

Examining 5-forces from the point of view of a customer.
Identifying favorable forces to preserve and/or increase overall customer value.
Using the CFS-CART Framework to identify market power influences on customer
value.

•
•

Applying an integrated view of 5-Forces and CART benefits to clusters of value.
Longitudinally applying 5-forces to evaluate value under varying levels of industry
structure.
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•

Studying individual and collective constructs to better understand the underlying
influences on overall value.

IV.3.1 Limitations.
While encouraging in its findings and their implications for hospital executives facing
difficult decisions relative to robotic surgery programs, this examination was not without
limitations. This research was limited by the lack of access to interview industry stakeholders.
This qualitative analysis was conducted exclusively using only public data sources. There were
scarce public disclosures regarding robotic manufacturers’ agreements with their suppliers. The
use of interviews could have been beneficial in gaining current perspectives from industry
participants, while mitigating potential researcher biases. The data was also less subject to
retrospective biases, since the accounts were taken during or shortly after the period examined.
The examination and coding of hundreds of public documents allowed for multiple, time
sensitive perspectives. Additionally, the inclusion of interviews would not necessarily overcome
the limitations related to access of supplier-manufacturer contractual agreements to explore
supplier power. Despite its limitations, this exploration offered theoretical and practical
applications which may help hospital administrators prepare for the future of robotic surgery and
other capital-intensive medical innovations.
IV.3.2 Future Research.
After evaluating the past 15 years of robotic surgery, consider the opportunity to think
prospectively. The robotic surgery market is estimated to grow to $20 billion by 2020 (Seeking
Alpha, 2015). The current period, 2015 - 2020, will likely include a shifting industry structure
that will continue to favor robotic manufacturers. Several new robotic surgery manufacturers
may enter the market. The existing manufacturers will have to strategically resolve how to
compete against direct competition and persisting substitute surgical techniques. New robots
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from existing and emergent manufacturers might be released to treat varying levels of procedural
complexities. Traditional surgery will likely continue to diminish, but the challenges of the
Affordable Care Act and governmental healthcare efforts will influence hospital approaches to
capital-intensive medical innovations. Robotic surgery systems will become more prevalent, as
the unit of measurement for adoption will shift from hospitals to operating rooms. It will
become more incumbent upon hospital executives to design robotic implementation and
management plans specific to their organizational needs if they are to be clinically, financially,
and strategically successful. Researchers during this period may want to include the following to
assist hospitals in the continued improvement of clinical, financial and strategic outcomes:
•

The role of leadership development in accessing latent value in RSPs

•

The role of governmental policies and regulations on robotic technologies.

•

An examination of hospital executive perspectives on the role of supplier power on
customer lifetime value.

•

The use of training mechanisms to reduce robotic operational costs.

This study represents an empirical analysis of industry structure and customer value in robotic
surgery. Some proponents may find the introduction of an integrative model for measuring
customer value in robotic surgery applicable to other capital-intensive medical innovations or
disruptive technologies at large.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: INDUSTRY STRUCTURE DEFINITIONS
FORCES AND SUB-FORCES

EXEMPLARS

THREAT OF NEW ENTRY

Economies of Scale

Production costs, sales volumes, and employee resources

Demand-side Benefits of Scale

Installation base, pricing, procedural volumes, and clinical publications

Government Policy

FDA & Foreign equivalent regulatory statements and information

Capital Requirement

Research and development funding and accumulated debt
Implementation costs, recurring costs, estimates of customer inventory levels,
on-going service obligations, physician learning curve
Number of sales and marketing personnel

Switching Costs
Access to Distribution
Incumbency Advantages
Independent of Size
Expected Retaliation

Number of patents and procedural experience (by volume)
Cash available and history of legal action

INTENSITY OF RIVALRY: CURRENT COMPETITORS

Competitive Balance

Revenue, market cap, sales, employee base, and accumulated deficit

Industry Growth

Overall industry growth rate

Fixed/Marginal Costs

Total assets as a measure to evaluate fixed and storage costs.

Differentiation

Product characteristics

Overcapacity

Production levels and evidence of price-cutting

Competitive Diversity

Compared corporate goals, objectives, and strategies t

Strategic Stakes

Corporate statements

Exit Barriers

Estimation of assets, inventories, and accumulated debt

SUBSTITUTIONS

Price-performance Trade-off
Buyer’s Cost of Switching to
Substitute

Clinical comparison data
Capital cost, instrument cost, and procedural cost data

BUYER BARGAINING POWER

Buyer Concentration

Data regarding hospital purchasing groups and the hospital industry

Service Differentiation

Product characteristics

Industry Purchases

Capital cost, procedural cost, and recurring operating cost

Backward Integration

Competitive activity and narrative information

Switching Costs

Instrument and system cost information

Buyer Margins

Hospital industry data and narratives

Service Importance

Clinical data and narrative information

Full Information

Industry disclosure

SUPPLIER BARGAINING POWER

Concentration

Switching Costs

Industry disclosure specific to the robotic surgery manufacturers
Industry knowledge specific to the robotic surgery products and the importance
of those products based upon product contributions
Manufacturer statements regarding alternative suppliers

Differentiation

Manufacturer statements regarding customized parts and services

Substitutes

Manufacturer statements regarding supplier alternatives solutions

Forward Integration

Supplier core competencies, demonstrated capabilities, and corporate statements

Dependency
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APPENDIX 2: CUSTOMER VALUE DEFINITIONS
CUSTOMER VALUE
CC (Clinical Core Benefits)
CA (Clinical Add-on Benefits)
CR (Clinical Relational benefits)
CT (Clinical transactional benefits)
FC (Financial Core Benefits)
FA (Financial Add-on Benefits)
FR (Financial Relational benefits)
FT (Financial transactional
benefits)
SC (Strategic Core Benefits)
SA (Strategic Add-on Benefits)
SR (Strategic Relational benefits)
ST (Strategic transactional
benefits)

DEFINITIONS
Medical benefits or perceived medical benefits of
converting open procedures to MIS
Medical benefits or perceived benefits of creating unique
value present
Medical benefits or perceived long-term or interpersonal
benefits between surgeons and patients
Medical benefits or perceived short-term or operational
benefits
Financial benefits or perceived benefits of converting open
procedures to MIS
Financial benefits or perceived benefits of creating unique
value
Financial benefits or perceived long-term or interpersonal
benefits between program stakeholders
Financial benefits or perceived short-term acquisition
and/or operational costs
Strategic benefits or perceived benefits of converting open
procedures to MIS
Strategic benefits or perceived benefits of creating unique
value
Strategic benefits or perceived long-term or interpersonal
benefits
Strategic benefits or perceived short-term or operational
benefits
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EXAMPLES
Patient benefits of MIS
Patient benefits specific
to robotics
Patient Satisfaction
Favorable procedural
times
Lower treatment costs
Incremental revenue
Program profitability
Robotic costs
Attracting physicians
and patients
New market leadership
positions
Surgeon satisfaction
Marketing

APPENDIX 3: GLOSSARY

CART – Core, Add-on, Relational, and Transactional
CFS – Clinical, Financial and Strategic
MIS – minimally invasive surgery
RSP – robotic surgery program
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FIGURE 17: DA VINCI STANDARD ROBOTIC SYSTEM

(Robotic Surgery, 2008)
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FIGURE 18: ZEUS ROBOTIC SYSTEM (COMPUTER MOTION)

(Wikilogia Med, 2012)

(Focosi, 2014)
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FIGURE 19: CITATIONS

(Belgian Health Knowledge Center, 2009)
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FIGURE 20: MITRAL VALVE PORT-SITE ROBOTIC APPROACH

(Chitwood, W. J., Kypson, A. P., and Nifong, L. W. 2003)

178

FIGURE 21: MARKETING ROBOTIC SURGERY

(HCA Healthcare, 2003)
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